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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 The golden age of the Royal Navy, which saw its apotheosis at the Battle of 
Trafalgar in 1805, also presented one of the great paradoxes of modern naval 
organization. Young gentlemen, some as young as eight or nine, were placed in 
positions of authority aboard His Majestys ships and expected to command veteran 
mariners with decades of sea experience. The effectiveness of this system, and the 
continued success of the Royal Navy as an institution, tended to belie the obvious 
disadvantages of placing adolescent recruits on the quarterdecks of active men-of-war.  
 This study examines two aspects of the process that allowed midshipmen and 
quarterdeck boys to function within the shipboard hierarchy and offers explanation by 
way of J. C. D. Clarks theory of a persistent ancien régime mentality in English society.  
Part I examines the selection of boys destined for command. A trend that began in 
the late 1770s saw a dramatic increase in the number of Honorable boys, those with 
significant social and or political interest, entering the service. Many senior officers 
lamented the preferential treatment granted these young notables and its deleterious effect 
on subordination. Within the context of Clarks theory of a patrician hegemony, the 
desirability of a naval career during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
meant that, increasingly, opportunities benefited the elite. The natural authority granted 
by birth was also widely accepted by the men of the lower deck, despite social unrest 
stirring in France and the effects of the Great Mutinies of 1797.   
Part II looks at the sources of a young gentlemans authority. Those institutions, 
both naval and civilian, that granted young gentlemen their practical and theoretical 
status as officers-in-training, also reinforced the structure of the old order.  
  vi
The increasing social status of young gentlemen in the Royal Navy of the Great 
Wars and the processes that maintained their authority reflected wider social and cultural 
trends  developments that confirmed the view of Georgian England as an ancien régime.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1
INTRODUCTION  
 
In 1800 Midshipman Lord William Fitzroy, fourth son of the Duke of Grafton, 
passed his examination for lieutenant and entered the ranks of the Royal Navys 
commissioned officers. Though only eighteen, a full two years shy of the minimum age 
required to become a lieutenant, Fitzroys political and social interest superceded 
Admiralty regulations and propelled his career forward. Rapid promotion continued and 
Fitzroy received his step to post captain in 1804.1 A series of uneventful commands did 
not prevent Fitzroys appointment to the new, thirty-eight gun frigate HMS Macedonian 
in 1810. As plum an appointment as the Royal Navy could offer at the time, 
Macedonian represented the opportunity for independent cruising in the increasingly 
hostile American shipping lanes. She also presented Fitzroy his best chance of making 
prizes from the vastly reduced fleet of French merchantmen plying the Atlantic trade in 
the wake of Trafalgar. Macedonians newly completed crew of more than three hundred 
mariners and Royal Marines experienced a taste of Fitzroys temperament with the 
enforcement of his first standing order that required the men address him as my Lord 
rather than Captain. Fitzroys next order condemned a seaman to forty-eight lashes for 
the very sailor like offense of getting drunk,2 a sentence four times the standard  
punishment traditionally allowed a captain outside a court martial. By March 1811 
Fitzroy stood before his own court martial facing charges brought by Macedonians 
sailing master who accused him of falsifying expense reports on ships stores and 
                                                
1 The National Archives of the UK (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO) Reference Books 359.3 ADB,  
   Steels Navy List, December, 1801. 
2 Samuel Leech, Thirty Years from Home; or, a Voice from the Main Deck (London: H. G. Collins, 1851),  
   p. 27. 
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profiting from the difference. The findings of the Admiralty court, however, focused on 
Fitzroys brutality towards the men as much as the charges of fraud, citing False 
Expense of Stores  Tyranny and Oppression as the basis for his dismissal from the 
service.3 Five months later, Fitzroy reappeared in the navy list, fully reinstated without 
loss of seniority. Political and social weight had, once again, intervened in Fitzroys 
favor, proving that connections could trump Admiralty law, even when that law 
supported the best interests of the service. Despite Fitzroys public flouting of naval 
authority, he continued to profit from the Royal Navys rigid system of promotion. 
Beyond the rank of post captain, seniority alone controlled advancement and elevation to 
flag rank. Although discreetly denied active command after 1811, Fitzroy progressed 
inevitably up the naval ladder, becoming an admiral and drawing an admirals pay until 
his death in 1857. 
Fitzroys story reflects two important trends evident in the Royal Navy during the 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. First, it exemplifies the increasing weight 
ascribed to aristocratic and political connections in both the selection of young officers 
for sea service and the pace of their promotion. Second, it reveals a growing concern on 
the part of the Admiralty for the treatment of seamen whose protests commanded greater 
attention in the wake of the 1797 mutinies.  
In the years after the Peace of Amiens, high-ranking contemporaries including 
First Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl St. Vincent and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Mediterranean Fleet, Viscount Horatio Nelson, voiced their concerns for the influx of 
aristocratic and politically-favored boys into the service. Their concerns addressed the 
issue of social precedence and its corrosive effects on naval professionalism. They 
                                                
3 TNA: PRO ADM12/27D, Black Book, Vol. III, 1807-1815. 
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understood too, that the root of the problem lay with the entry-level quarterdeck ranks  
with those boys who entered the service, typically between the ages of nine and nineteen, 
with the express aim of becoming sea officers. Known officially as young gentlemen, 
this title encompassed a variety of epithets that fell in and out of favor during the course 
of the Great Wars. Midshipman, Captains Servant, Volunteer First Class, Boy First 
Class, were all used to indicate boys being groomed for command. While N. A. M. 
Rodger argues that the eighteenth century Admiralty had almost no control over the 
recruitment of its officers,4 something changed during the course of the French 
Revolutionary Wars such that the 1803 mobilization saw nearly four times as many 
Honorable midshipmen, that is the sons of baronets or higher, pass the examination for 
lieutenant than during the 1793 mobilization.5 While a strong middle-class element6 
continued to flourish in the navys corps of junior officers, the sons of noblemen and 
high-ranking gentlemen represented a rapidly growing minority during the Great Wars.   
Synchronous to this trend were broadening concerns for the treatment of seamen. 
The fleet-wide mutinies of 1797 highlighted the potential for anarchy, if not in the minds 
of mariners then in the consciousness of officers whose numbers represented a tiny 
portion of the complement of any man-of-war. The precariousness of the social structure 
that sustained the power of the quarterdeck had become all too clear. Officers who 
brutalized seamen without justification felt the wrath of an Admiralty keen to avoid 
further uprisings from the lower deck. For midshipmen and quarterdeck boys, the 
                                                
4 N. A. M. Rodger, Officers, Gentlemen and their Education, 1793-1860, in Les Empires en  
  Guerre et Paix, Journées Franco-Anglais dHistoire de la Marine, Portsmouth, 23-36 Mars,  
  1988, ed. Edward Freeman (Vincennes, France: Service Historique de la Marine, 1990), p. 139. 
5 TNA: PRO Ref. Bks. 359.3 ADB, Steels Navy List, 1794-1815. See Appendix A.  
6 Michael Lewis, A Social History of the Navy, 1793-1815 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960), p. xii. 
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curtailing of disrespectful or unnecessarily authoritarian behavior took different forms, all 
of which tended to limit their authority.  
The apparently conflicting social dynamics that produced a more aristocratic and 
gentlemanly midshipmans berth and at the same time hobbled its authoritative status 
provide the two thematic approaches for this study. The factors that produced these shifts, 
whether internal or external to the Royal Navy, offer a key to understanding 
developments in the attitudes of both the Admiralty and the men of George IIIs navy. 
The general trends apparent within the service also present a microcosmic view of wider 
patterns in English society at large during the Great Wars. 
Two Critical Events for the Georgian Navy  
A direct correlation can be drawn between the rising social status of a naval career 
and the level of political and social interference in the appointment of young gentlemen. 
The decision to take a boy to sea as an officer-in-training traditionally resided with 
individual captains; however, the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries saw a 
variety of pressures intrude upon that prerogative. During Pepysian days when a naval 
career ranked among the lowliest, least-desirable of professions, the Royal Navy and her 
commanders enjoyed a substantial measure of operational independence, distanced as 
they were from the kinds of political and social influences so prevalent in army 
recruitment and promotion. As Pepys noted in his Naval Minutes, have any of our  
Heralds allowed in express words the seaman for a gentleman?7  
During the last quarter of the seventeenth century, royal attempts to correct this 
situation led to a greater separation between gentlemen and tarpaulin officers, those 
                                                
7 Samuel Pepys, Naval Minutes, quoted in Geoffrey Holmes, Augustan England: Professions, State and  
  Society, 1680-1730 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 275. 
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of humble origin raised from the lower deck as thorough-going professionals. The 
emergence of Kings Letter Boys or volunteers per order, genteel young recruits seeking 
a naval career, represented the political push to create a new corps of well-bred and 
professional officers. But the effort begun during the reign of Charles II had gained only 
a little momentum by that of George I and a pronounced social mix in the 
commissioned ranks of the Royal Navy remained a prominent feature of naval life.8 The 
process of stereotyping young officers according to their lowest common social 
denominator continued well into the last quarter of the eighteenth century, bolstered by 
the fact that in the unnatural world of the Royal Navy, the order of civil society was 
subverted.9 Distinctions of dress, accommodation, diet, and most importantly, the 
deference afforded by noble birth, blurred in the dank confines of the midshipmans berth 
and upon that great social leveler, the quarterdeck. Aboard a man-of-war, naval rank 
superceded social rank. Between the American and French Revolutionary Wars, 
however, the equation began to change.  
The first important event to affect general opinions of a naval career occurred in 
1779 when George III sent his third son, Prince William Henry, to sea as a midshipman 
with the instructions, the young man goes as a sailor, and as such, I add again, no marks 
of distinction are to be shown unto him; they would destroy my whole plan.10 Exactly 
what this plan might have been is open to speculation. As the first Hanoverian to 
proclaim himself an Englishman first and foremost, Georges commitment of a son to the 
sea service tendered proof of his patriotic zeal. It also reflected a belief in the need for 
                                                
8 Holmes, Augustan, p. 276. 
9 N. A. M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815 (New York: W. W.  
  Norton, 2004), p. 392. 
10 King George III to Sir S. Hood, June 11, 1779, quoted in Rodger, Command, p. 388. 
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princes to acquire first-hand knowledge of naval and military institutions, as prerequisites 
for informed and empathic leadership. The decision was, however, a socially radical, 
even revolutionary11 step which instantly improved public perceptions of the Royal 
Navy and elevated its officers to an unprecedented level of social acceptability. In the 
following decades, the rising social status of officers in the Royal Navy encouraged the 
sons (not always the younger) of aristocratic families (not always impoverished) to seek 
positions as young gentlemen aboard men-of-war. Yearly editions of Steels Navy List 
from the French Revolutionary Wars show an increasing number of Honorable 
midshipmen becoming lieutenants, indicating the growing popularity of a naval career. 
For the French Revolutionary Wars, this trend peaked in 1797,12 the year of the illustrious 
Battle of Cape St. Vincent for which Sir John Jervis earned his eponymous earldom and 
Nelson rose to international fame.  
1797 also marked the second great watershed for social dynamics within the 
Royal Navy. A series of mutinies beginning with the Channel Fleet at Spithead, followed 
by ships stationed at the Nore, then by the North Sea Squadron at Yarmouth, sent 
shockwaves through naval command, rudely reminding both the Admiralty and 
Parliament that order depended entirely on the consent of the seamen who worked their 
ships.  
These two events affected both internal and external perceptions of the Royal 
Navy and forced senior officers to reevaluate their methods and their men in order to 
preserve discipline as much as the functionality of the service. Disdain for young, 
aristocratic incompetents like Lord William Fitzroy mounted, prompting St. Vincent to 
                                                
11 Rodger, Command, p. 388. 
12 See Appendix A, Honorable Lieutenants Passed by Year, per Steels Navy List. 
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remark in 1806 that this vast overflow of young nobility in the Service makes rapid 
strides to the decay of Seamanship, as well as Subordination. . . .13 St. Vincents 
concerns for the professionalism of officers and the maintenance of discipline and order 
aboard ship summarized two of the crucial issues involving midshipmen and quarterdeck 
boys during the Great Wars.   
Part I of this study addresses the selection of officers-in-training between 1793 
and 1815 and indicates the extent to which wider social, political, and cultural trends 
infiltrated the Royal Navy and encroached upon the independence of captains in their 
selection of young gentlemen destined for command. The result of such intervention was 
a mounting tension between sea officers who originated from the middling ranks14 of 
society and a corps of aristocratic young gentlemen whose influence confused the line 
between social and naval subordination.  
Part II addresses the concern voiced by Lord St. Vincent and other senior officials 
for the professionalism of future naval officers. Over the course of the Great Wars the 
nature of the authority wielded by young gentlemen changed in order to remedy abuses 
and as a response to the new social dynamic between lower deck and quarterdeck. The 
cultural and institutional constructs that enabled inexperienced boys to command veteran 
able seamen altered subtly as a result of the 1797 mutinies. Internal sources of authority 
generated by a ships captain, and ultimately by Admiralty law, were also tempered by 
external influences such as revolutionary political and social instability, education, and 
                                                
13 The Earl St. Vincent to Benjamin Tucker, Esq., HMS Hibernia off Ushant, March 17, 1806, in Jedediah  
    S. Tucker, ed. Memoirs of the Right Honourable the Earl St. Vincent G.C.B. etc., Vol. II (London:  
    Richard Bentley, 1844), p. 270. 
14 Contemporaries preferred middling sort or middling rank to the term middle class, which came  
    into use in the 1790s. Its members did not like to think of themselves belonging to a rigid social strata  
    implied by the word class. See Langford, Polite, p. 61. 
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religion. Both sets of influences produced occasionally conflicting results, at times 
limiting and at times reinforcing the authority of midshipmen and quarterdeck boys.  
While signs of a changing social equation within Britain in the last decade of the 
eighteenth century appeared in the altered character of a petty officers authority, an 
increasingly aristocratic midshipmans berth and a narrowing field of selection for entry-
level officers reflected wider social and political currents that, in fact, supported the 
maintenance of an ancien régime in British society. The conflict inherent in the position 
of the quarterdeck boy embodied the dueling forces within the Royal Navy and within 
society at large  between old-order traditions and social mobility. The ability of the 
service to absorb the effects of both and to emerge as a strong, professional institution 
that flourished late into the nineteenth century provides evidence of the flexibility and 
resilience of the Royal Navy as a sub-culture of Georgian society. 
Testing Social Theories Using the Royal Navy Model  
Characterizations of English society as either a dynamic state or an old order 
draw principally on the works of two scholars with opposing views on the nature of 
eighteenth-century society. Paul Langford challenges all notions of stability, classifying 
the long eighteenth century as a period of massive and universal change. Expanding on 
the contemporary view that agricultural and industrial developments wrought a 
fundamental alteration in the English people,15 Langford focuses on the growing middle 
classes and their pursuit of polite status in all its forms including wealth, social rank, 
and political power as the catalyst for social evolution. The idea that the debasement of 
                                                
15 John Andrews, quoted in Paul Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, England 1727-1783 (Oxford:  
    Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 679. 
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gentility is one of the clearest signs of social change,16 became manifest in the 
operational standards of the Royal Navy of the early-eighteenth century. Here was an 
institution that effectively opened professional opportunities to boys of the lower to 
middling orders. From the 1730s until the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Royal 
Navy command represented a largely unchallenged meritocracy and one of the best 
enablers of social mobility. The impartial handling of midshipmen who originated from a 
broad spectrum of social ranks reflected the navys disregard for traditional social 
hierarchies in its command structure. It also reflected the Admiraltys recognition of the 
need to build an officer corps based on ability and skill. According to Langford, by the 
close of the eighteenth century, the broadening middle classes, which included even 
modest artisans and producers of commercial goods, represented an increased threat to 
traditional notions of a hierarchical society.17 Young naval officers elevated from 
humble backgrounds only contributed to that threat.  
A culture of freedom and mobility, influenced by the liberalism of Romantic 
radicals, found support from opposition Whigs and Dissenting ministers who touted the 
constitutional rights of Englishmen, applicable to all regardless of social rank. The 
Royal Navys appreciation of democratic principles sharpened in the wake of fleet-wide 
mutiny, an event that sparked a new social conscience among officers whose 
vulnerability had become all too obvious. In the first decade of the new century Captain 
Alexander Ball noted that no body of men can for any length of time be safely treated 
otherwise than as rational beings. . . . Midshipmen who attacked these newly 
                                                
16 Langford, Polite, p. 66. 
17 Paul Langford, ed., The Eighteenth Century, 1688-1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 14. 
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rational18 mariners, either physically or verbally without sufficient justification, found 
themselves whipped, mastheaded, disrated, or dismissed from the service.  
The relationship between lower deck and quarterdeck altered as the new balance 
of power within the Royal Navy forced officers to confront the old precept of rule by 
consent. More humane approaches to the management of crews and the fostering of 
patriotic fervor amongst the lower deck echoed elements of a dynamic social equation 
and the transmutation of democratic revolutionary ideology into a far safer form  that of 
enlightened nationalism. In these developments the Royal Navy example supports 
Langfords theory of sweeping social change. But while change undoubtedly occurred 
over the course of the long eighteenth century, its manifestations both within the 
Admiralty and aboard its men-of-war diverge from Langfords unidirectional model of 
social progress.   
In contrast to Langford, J. C. D. Clark champions the notion of England as an 
ancien régime. Clark argued that throughout the Great Wars, England remained a pre-
industrial, aristocratic, confessional state, in which the twin foundations of society  
law and religion  maintained a state of patrician hegemony over a broad social 
spectrum. While this diversity spurred conflict, from socio-economic discord to religious 
upheavals, Clark argues that the ability of English society to absorb these shocks, to settle 
on middle ground, and to assimilate rather than revolt grew from a fundamental social 
consensus: that the dominance of the patrician elite was justified by laws both natural and 
revealed.19 Clark acknowledges that by the close of the eighteenth century, some degree 
of mobility into (and out of) the patrician elite was possible in England, an observation 
                                                
18 Captain Alexander Ball and Captain Anselm Griffiths, quoted in Rodger, Command, p. 491. 
19 J. C. D. Clark, English Society 1660-1832: Religion, Ideology and Politics During the Ancien Régime,  
   Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 15, 17, 25, 35-36. 
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that broadens his definition of aristocracy to include members of the gentry who 
possessed significant political and financial clout.20 Clarks argument, that 
contemporary perceptions of the power and influence of the nobility and gentry were 
legion, builds upon the social theories of David Hume who understood that true 
authority could not be imposed by deception or force but depended on the willingness 
of the many to obey the few because they saw in the few a certain embodiment of their 
aspirations.21  
In naval terms, Clarks model is supported by traditional notions of a rigid 
shipboard hierarchy, whereby every man minded his place, and honored the system of 
ranks and privileges out of a combination of duty and resignation, hope and tradition. 
During the Great Wars, the increasing number of midshipmans appointments granted on 
the basis of noble birth and/or political influence also supported the notion of an 
ascendant elite. In the last decades of the eighteenth century selection favoring those with 
social rank, parliamentary favor, or at the very least, connections to a high-ranking naval 
officer, superceded the navys position as an open meritocracy and thus reflected a 
renewed state of patrician hegemony in naval command. N. A. M. Rodger relates this 
trend to a reaction against the revolutionary ideas circulating in the wake of regicide in 
France: just as the French navy abandoned its tradition of choosing officers from the 
nobility in favour of the career open to talent, the British Navy started moving in the 
opposite direction.22  
The widening gap between quarterdeck and lower deck which, by 1815, looked 
more like a chasm, supports Clarks theory of a dominant patrician element. While the 
                                                
20 Ibid., p. 24. 
21 Ibid., pp. 35, 24. 
22 Rodger, Command, p. 508. 
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particulars of shipboard society evolved during the late 1790s, the general hierarchy 
remained, becoming more firmly rooted in traditional social systems with each new 
generation of notable Royal Navy recruits. It is undeniable that, by the turn of the 
nineteenth century, the relationship between officers and men depended more heavily on 
expectations of professionalism and mutually respectful conduct; however, the old codes 
of paternalism and deference within shipboard society remained firm. With the new 
century, the Royal Navy came to mirror the social make-up of a greater patrician society, 
one in which birth, political connections, and/or wealth determined opportunities for 
advancement.  
Complications arose, however, with the influx of young officers whose 
appointments and promotions came primarily as the result of interest. A process of 
advancement that subordinated skill, motivation, or instinct for command to 
qualifications of birth and connection threatened the implicit contract of professionalism 
between officers and seamen. Unworthy junior officers were hardly revered by mariners 
and subsequently struggled to maintain real authority. From the quarterdeck perspective, 
reassertion of the old social order wrought havoc on the chain of command. By the start 
of the Napoleonic Wars, the pressure on captains to take up aristocratic boys who were 
not cut out for naval life increased. Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood complained of one 
noble youth aboard his flagship: . . . he is of no more use here as an officer than Bounce 
is, and not near so entertaining.23 Bounce was Collingwoods dog. While it did not 
necessarily follow that all aristocratic boys lacked talent, or a real desire to serve at sea, 
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the problems raised by the presence of socially-superior boys aboard Georgian men-of-
war posed a serious threat to the effectiveness of naval subordination. Officers of less 
exalted status than Collingwood often moderated disciplinary measures against the sons 
of notables, aware that in the prevailing political climate, their actions might receive 
career-damaging censure. As shown in Part II of this study, lieutenants directly in charge 
of quarterdeck boys became particularly conscious of whose interest their juniors 
represented, as promotion to commander and post captain relied, to a large extent, on the 
political favor of the Admiralty. In this way, the gentrification of the midshipmans berth 
threatened the professionalism of the quarterdeck and justified concerns for the future of 
naval seamanship. 
The Royal Navys ability to avoid destruction from competing internal and 
external forces  from political influences on appointments, to social tensions affecting 
shipboard hierarchies and the distribution of authority  is best explained using Clarks 
concept of assimilation, whereby social tensions were absorbed into a system based on 
patrician hegemony. Roy Porter supports Clarks notions of elasticity and resilience 
in English social hierarchies as they reinforced the old order. Such qualities emphasized 
the fact that while English society was inegalitarian and oozing privilege . . . it was 
neither brittle nor rigid. 24 It is a description that accurately characterizes the naval 
command structure.  
The precedence given to boys with aristocratic and political influence, at the 
expense of open entry and rewards based principally on merit, did not substantially 
impede the Admiraltys ability to maintain operational effectiveness throughout the Great 
                                                
24 Roy Porter, English Society in the Eighteenth Century, Revised Edition (London: Penguin Books, 1991),  
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Wars. The manoeuvring of aristocratic young gentlemen, often through promotion into 
less crucial roles, as in the case of Lord William Fitzroy, provided a respectable yet 
effective outlet for young men unsuited to sea command. For those who remained afloat, 
the paternalistic duty that demanded expertise and infallibility from superiors echoed the 
expanding reputation of the service. The decisive and popular victory at Trafalgar in 1805 
pressured junior officers to shape up, spurred by the threat of public ignominy and 
professional humiliation if their conduct failed to meet expectations.  
While elements of Langfords theory of social dynamics appear relevant to the 
1797 mutinies and the more humane handling of seamen that resulted, interpretations of 
old-order utilitarian motivations are equally apparent on either side of the 1797 uprisings. 
The failure of the Admiralty to fulfill its basic duty of sustaining the health and welfare of 
its seamen collided with the need to keep mariners contented if the Royal Navys fleets 
were to remain functional. Mutual need uncovered middle ground and the opportunity for 
conciliation within the existing social and institutional structure. Mariners appreciation 
for strong and effective command did not dwindle with the institution of more restrained 
approaches to authority and the use of discipline. The professional pride of lower-deck 
men tended, in fact, to favor the type of authoritative command that conducted a tight 
ship.25 Such attitudes only reinforced the old shipboard hierarchies. Demands for a 
higher level of professionalism from the quarterdeck encouraged even greater separation 
between officers and their men, providing further evidence of Clarks social ancien 
régime.  
Langfords vision of an increasingly open English society driven by merit might 
appear more relevant to the reduction of the navy at the close of the Napoleonic Wars. 
                                                
25 Rodger, Command, p. 493. 
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The process of paying off hundreds of ships and beaching thousands of young officers 
allowed the Admiralty to keep only the cream of career officers and those who thrived on 
the new dynamics of shipboard life. Yet, the lasting effects of officer gentrification on the 
navy of the mid to late-nineteenth century favor Clarks explanation of a continuing 
patrician hegemony. Rodger acknowledges the social polarization of lower deck 
commoners and quarterdeck gentlemen, a phenomenon that became glaringly 
apparent by 1815.26 Aristocratic and political demand saw a greater number of positions 
for boys diverted to the sons of the elite, producing, by the end of the Napoleonic Wars, a 
more socially homogeneous officer corps than had existed at the close of the Seven 
Years War.27 
Rodger emphasizes a vision of the Royal Navy as a microcosm of English society, 
reflecting wider trends and developments that took place in the long eighteenth century:  
. . . for all its undoubted peculiarities, the Navy resembled the society from which it was 
recruited in many more ways than it differed from it.28 While Paul Langfords dynamic 
state describes the naval example up until the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the 
evolutions of the 1790s through the 1810s reveal limitations in the application of his 
theory. As the quarterdeck increasingly became the realm of the gentleman, Clarks 
notion of a patrician ascendancy more accurately represents the developments taking 
place in George IIIs Navy. Resilience and flexibility within a traditional social hierarchy 
characterized the naval institution of the nineteenth century, allowing it to survive the 
strains of complex social and political times.  
                                                
26 Rodger, Officers, p. 140.  
27 Lewis, Social, p. 177, and Rodger, Command, p. 527.  
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Clark notes evolutions within the hegemonic set of ideas which provided the 
ideological framework within which the changes happened. It was an ancien régime that 
embraced fluctuations in the social order (eschewing notions of stasis) to produce a state 
that represented hegemony rather than consensus. The social changes that took place in 
the Royal Navy of the Great Wars support the conclusion that modernity did not mean 
the end of Old England.29 The application of Clarks theory to the changing processes 
of selection and to evolutions in the authority of midshipmen and quarterdeck boys 
provides the framework for this study.     
Identifying the Quarterdeck Boy 
Michael Lewis definition of quarterdeck boy as opposed to lower deck boy 
is useful in broadly identifying the difference between young men who possessed a good 
chance of attaining commissioned status and those whose highest aspiration might be that 
of able seaman or, at best, warrant officer (gunner, carpenter, boatswain, coxswain, 
steward, or sailing master). It also eliminates problems created by the changing 
conventions and rating systems that spanned the period under consideration. Before 1794 
the most popular form of entry for quarterdeck boys was as captains servant. Despite 
the implications, there was nothing menial about the position. Captains servants were 
quarterdeck protégés, officers in the making, for whom the assignment of servile duties 
would have represented a serious insult and demotion. Captains were encouraged to take 
on as many servants as possible by dint of the fact that they received the pay, eighteen 
shillings per lunar month,30 of each boy under their care. Muster rolls for three of the 
largest ships present at the Battle of Quiberon Bay on November 20, 1759 show high 
                                                
29 Clark, Society, pp. 25, 41. 
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ratios of captains servants to the total complement of Royal Navy men. (Excludes Royal 
Marines). 
Table 1: Ratios of Quarterdeck Boys to Total Complements, 1759. 
Ship Captain/Admiral Complement  
(R.N. only) 
Captains Servants Ratio Capts. 
Servants to Crew 
Namur Buckle 651 32 1:20 
Royal George Campbell/Hawke 780 18 1:43 
Union Hardy/Evans 659 30 1:22 
Sources: TNA: PRO ADM36/6255, 5747, 6948, Muster Books for Nov/Dec 1759, HMS Namur, HMS 
Royal George, and HMS Union respectively. 
 
In 1794 an Order in Council introduced the new rating of Boy First Class or 
First Class Volunteer, theoretically abolishing all other entry-level ratings in an effort 
to limit the number of boys bound for the quarterdeck to the regulation four-per-hundred 
of the total crew.31 As compensation, captains wages increased, although it was likely 
that the disparity saw many captains suffer financially. A comparative table showing the 
number of first class volunteers and boys as a function of ships complements from three 
of the largest ships at the Battle of Trafalgar, October 21, 1805 demonstrates a significant 
change. (See Table 2) 
It should be noted, however, that ways around the system were available and 
popular. One method of circumventing regulations involved rating quarterdeck boys as 
able seamen, thereby disguising their presence as far as the ships official muster was 
concerned. 
 
 
                                                
31 Lewis, Social, p. 156. 
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Table 2: Ratios of Quarterdeck Boys to Total Complements, 1805. 
Ship Captain/Admiral Complement  
(R.N. only) 
1st Class Boys & 
Volunteers 
Ratio 1st Class 
Boys to Crew 
Victory Hardy/Nelson 663 9 1:73 
Royal Sovereign Rotherham/Collingwood 850* 7 1:121 
Temeraire Harvey 718 8 1:89 
Sources: Robert Holden Mackenzie, The Trafalgar Roll, The Ships and the Officers, intro. by Colin White 
(London: Chatham Publishing, 2004), pp. 2, 25, 47; and Dudley Pope, Decision at Trafalgar (New York: 
Henry Holt & Co., 1999), pp. 189, 205. 
(*) Note: This figure reflected Royal Sovereigns intended complement, although it is known that she went 
into battle at Trafalgar undermanned and unable to fight her guns on both sides at once.  
 
 
Lieutenants passing certificates from 1805 show that 20 percent of those young 
gentlemen who passed that year entered the service rated able.32 By this time the 
practice of raising midshipmen and potential officers from the lower deck had faded. 
[T]he forty-year-old midshipman was becoming a rarity, as potential officers were 
increasingly singled out in childhood.33 Although no direct financial gains came from 
rating additional young gentlemen as able seamen, it provided captains with a means of 
granting politically advantageous favors (and thus boosting their own careers) at a time 
when appointments for quarterdeck boys were at a premium.  
Rodger suggests that the new volunteer ratings were tools of gentrification, 
arguing that the difference between the three classes of boy  first, second, and third  
were based not on professional knowledge but on birth. According to the Order in  
 
 
                                                
32 TNA: PRO ADM107/32&33, Lieutenants Passing Certificates, 1805. 
33 Lewis, Social, p. 267. 
  19
Council of 1794, Boys of the First Class were to consist of Young Gentlemen intended 
for the Sea Service . . . : to be styled Volunteers and allowed wages at the rate of ₤6 per 
annum. The Second Class was to consist of Boys between 15 and 17 years of age to be 
divided into watches with the seamen in order to make them such  at ₤5 per annum. 
The Third Class consisted of Boys between 13 and 15 years of age of whom Lieutenants 
and other officers who are now allowed servants might be permitted to recommend to the 
Captains, each of them one, to be the attendants upon such officers  at ₤4 per annum.34 
As Rodger notes, since no attempt was made to test whatever qualities [a boy] might 
possess, the only basis for the distinction . . . was that implied by the wording of the 
Order in Council; that is between gentlemen and the rest.35 The Order in Council of 
1794 was therefore a major indicator in the official trend towards sanctifying the 
quarterdeck as the exclusive realm of the gentleman. Controlling the number of official 
positions for officers-in-training and limiting the social groups capable of filling those 
positions, demonstrated the expanding influence of the Admiralty as a political body in 
matters traditionally held as a captains prerogative.  
For much of the eighteenth century, the selection of boys for sea service depended 
on a combination of influence with and connections to individual captains, enthusiasm, 
and luck. A relatively democratic process of selection made opportunities available to the 
sons of sea officers, professional men, and the middling sort as much as to the sons of 
peers. During the Great Wars, however, opportunities narrowed significantly. Political 
and social pressure demanded that noble and notable boys receive priority placement. 
The prevalence of book entry, the practice of entering a boys name in the muster years 
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in advance of his actual appearance on board, spoke to the weight of outside influence on 
a captain. False muster constituted a criminal offence, yet captains were very often 
willing to risk their careers and their reputations for the opportunity to wield patronage or 
advantage the son of a friend or relative. The five year-old Lord Thomas Cochrane, who 
would later become the 10th Earl of Dundonald, found his way onto the books of 
successive ships captained by his uncle Sir Alexander Cochrane. Lord Cochrane did not 
take up his first appointment as midshipman until the age of seventeen,36 by which time 
his seniority in the service was well established and most of his sea time required for the 
examination for lieutenant completed. As long a captain did not attempt to draw pay for 
the absentee able seaman or masters mate the Admiralty tended to turn a blind eye. 
Book entry, among other abuses, was not merely the province of gentleman 
captains serving their own family interests. For captains of more humble origin it 
represented an opportunity to exercise patronage  a decision that could benefit the son of 
a fellow mariner as readily as the son of a parliamentarian. Yet, as the Great Wars 
progressed, the political, social, and financial stakes associated with accepting the sons of 
the elite as quarterdeck volunteers soared. The prospect of personal and professional gain 
combined with Admiralty pressure to select boys backed by powerful interest narrowed 
the field of candidates. All captains, genteel and otherwise, felt a mounting pressure from 
above to accommodate the sons of notables, a factor that ensured the continuation of 
book entry well into the first decade of the nineteenth century.37  
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The Midshipmans Lot 
The life of a midshipman or quarterdeck boy aboard a Georgian man-of-war 
varied from ship to ship and captain to captain. Disparities in the age and competency of 
individual boys produced a wide range of experiences. On the one hand, there was 
Midshipman Hamilton Davies, who found himself in command of a fire-brig at age ten.38 
On the other hand, ten year-old William Henry Dillon was overwhelmed by the noise and  
activity aboard his first ship, HMS Saturn. His fears resulted in a surly and pensive 
mood that required the cheerful efforts and soothing expressions of his father.39 Most 
cases, however, fell somewhere between these extremes. Midshipmen and quarterdeck 
boys of all ages generally came under the immediate supervision of a ships lieutenants 
who served as both professional and personal mentors. Lieutenants regulated the 
separation of their own divisions into sub-divisions, placing a young gentleman in charge 
of each as a means of acquainting him with the duties of command. Standard 
responsibilities included such tasks as running aloft to supervise seamen in setting, 
reefing, or furling sail; supervising sub-divisions at small arms training; attending to the 
swift transition of the watch; maintaining the ships safety by constantly checking for 
naked lights and lanterns below decks; witnessing visits to the pursers, stewards or 
boatswains store rooms; and casting the log line in order to determine the speed and, 
when in soundings, the position of the ship. Beyond these basics, practical duties varied 
greatly, often depending on the type of ship in which a young gentleman served. Rodger 
notes the disparities from ship to ship: 
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It was commonly remarked that there were different types of midshipmen in 
different ships: sophisticated and hard-swearing in ships of the line, slovenly and 
ill-bred in little sloops and brigs, but an elite in the frigates, smart and proud of 
facing early danger and responsibility.40 
 
Much of this stereotyping stemmed from the nature of the commissions awarded 
the various ships. As reconnaissance vessels, frigates generally received independent 
cruises, detached from a fleet and were usually exempt from banal convoy duties. 
Intelligent, highly-motivated captains received these plum commands and typically 
wasted no time in seeking out engagement and potential prizes. Boys of similar mettle 
aspired to frigate service. By seventeen John Harvey Boteler, who later became a 
distinguished captain, expressed such a desire: . . . my brother Thomas and I, having 
served so far in ships of the line, both wished for a more active time in frigates. . . .41 A 
boys participation in boarding actions, cutting-out expeditions, and shore raids, all of 
which required hand-to-hand combat with pistols and dirks, were virtually assured in 
frigate service.42 The popularity and prestige of serving aboard a crack frigate meant 
that the sons of noblemen and prominent gentlemen often found their way into these 
scarce and coveted positions. The four frigates present during the Trafalgar action 
shipped one quarter of the aristocratic young gentlemen out of a fleet of thirty-three 
vessels.43 Yet for all the opportunities frigates presented for distinguished service and 
prize money, their quarterdeck boys sacrificed on comfort. Peter Cullen, a gentleman 
who served as surgeons mate aboard the frigate Squirrel, described the berth for himself, 
eight midshipmen, and two masters mates which consisted of two small spaces forward 
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of the officers quarters on the lower deck, where they slung their hammocks and ate their 
meals adjacent the bulk of the ships company.44 Genteel boys from comfortable middle 
and upper-class environments often expressed horror at the conditions aboard a man-of-
war. Young Frederick Chamier wrote of his coming aboard the frigate Salsette in 1809: 
I had anticipated a kind of elegant house with guns in the windows . . . [but found] 
the tars of England rolling about casks, without jackets, shoes or stockings . . . the 
deck was dirty, slippery, and wet; the smells abominable; the whole sight 
disgusting . . . I remarked the slovenly attire of the midshipmen, dressed in shabby 
round jackets, glazed hats, no gloves, and some without shoes. . . . 45 
 
Conditions were hardly better in larger ships. First through third rates (vessels of 
over one hundred guns down to vessels of sixty-four guns) allowed young gentlemen 
separate quarters. Midshipmen and quarterdeck boys aged fourteen and older berthed on 
the orlop, the lowest deck above the hold in a dank space forward of the mizzen mast 
dubbed the cockpit. At approximately five hundred to eleven hundred square feet, a 
ship of the lines cockpit accommodated anywhere from twenty to thirty-plus 
midshipmen, masters mates, surgeons mates and other petty officers,46 providing a 
place for them to eat, sleep, and pass their free time. Situated well below the water line, 
the cockpits only light came from tallow dips, whose stench mingled with the miasma of 
putrid bilge water, rotting timber, and the ooze from casks of rancid food. One 
midshipman, remarking on the dearth of air in the cockpit, noted that it was impossible to 
keep a flame alight. Proximity to the hold did not help matters. Long cruises often saw 
the build up of toxic gases in the hold which, despite their ability to asphyxiate human 
beings, failed to eradicate the vermin that infested the lower reaches of a ship. Robert 
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Mercer Wilson, a young captains clerk described the results of cleaning and smoking 
the hold of the frigate Unite in 1808: Opened the hatches, found about one thousand 
mice dead.47  
Edward Thompson Esq., a civilian commentator, lamented the conditions faced 
by young gentlemen who were bedded worse than hogs, and eat less delicacies. . . .48 
Midshipmen and boys, regardless of social rank, generally ate the same fare as seamen 
and warrant officers. Salt beef and pork, ships biscuit, cheese, pease porridge, portable 
soup, and the occasional fresh vegetable, all washed down with a gallon of small beer or 
a pint of grog each day made it a harsh transition for the palates of well-bred boys 
accustomed to fine food and wine. Invitations to dine at the captains table or in the ward 
room with the senior officers often brought the only respite from a menu that was at best 
tasteless and at worst putrid.  
Youngsters, or boys under thirteen, berthed with the gunner in the Gun Room. 
Not quite as stygian and a somewhat healthier place for an officers nursery, the Gun 
Room also provided adult supervision under a steady sort of man like the master 
gunner.49 Warrant officers were also known to bring their wives to sea despite Admiralty 
regulations, yet their function as surrogate mothers to the youngest quarterdeck recruits 
often contributed to the toleration these particular women aboard ship. Even boys lucky 
enough to find maternal care aboard a man-of-war endured a life of shocking rawness. 
Working uniforms consisted of coarse wool or kersey round-jackets and duck or canvas 
trousers. The short clothes of the navy offered little distinction between quarterdeck 
                                                
47 Wilson, Journal, p. 214. 
48 Mr. Thompson to J. T. Esq, November, 1755, in Edward Thompson, Sailors Letters, Written to His  
   Select Friends in England During his Voyages and Travels in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas  
   From the Year 1754 to 1759, Second Edition, Vol. I (London: Becket & de Hondt, 1767), p. 141.  
49 Lewis, Social, p. 262. 
  25
boys and their inferiors. Dress uniforms introduced prior to the Seven Years War 
allowed young gentlemen some outward signs of rank. Brass buttons and white collar 
patches on the same short wool jackets, breeches, and stockings lent some elegance to an 
otherwise undistinguished appearance. There were, of course, exceptions. Boteler aboard 
the frigate Orontes remarked, We were considered a crack ship, and the midshipmen 
dressed in cocked hats, tight white pantaloons and Hessian boots, with gilt twist edging 
and a bullion tassel. 50 Such sartorial splendor suggested a predominance of well-heeled 
boys, a far cry from Botelers shipmate aboard Dictator who had to make the best of his 
limited resources. John Jones a young Welsh lad, very good-humoured . . . had nothing 
but his pay, and yet he was the neatest dressed midshipman in the ship, his weekly 
account kept so white with pipe-clay.51 For some quarterdeck boys, affectations of 
elegance drew the wrath of senior officers who equated genteel standards of costume 
with signs of effeminacy and weakness. James Anthony Gardner, a midshipman aboard 
the Edgar in 1789, recalled an incident that brought the wrath his Admiral, the Honorable 
John Leveson Gower, down upon a fellow petty officer. He [Gower] was a mortal foe to 
puppyism, and one of our midshipmen going aloft with gloves on, attracted his eye; for 
which he got a rub down that I am certain he remembers to the present day. . . .52 
 Such instances provided brutal reminders of the distance, both physical and 
symbolic, separating naval and civilian life. Aboard His Majestys ships young 
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gentlemen, regardless of their background or social hauteur, worked, slept, ate, and 
dressed in ways that offered little of the comfort or distinction afforded by life ashore.  
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PART I  SELECTING YOUNG GENTLEMEN FOR SEA SERVICE 
 
Noble Rot 
 
The Earl St. Vincents audience with King George III, 1807: 
[A]nd the King asked him: Well Lord St. Vincent you have now quitted active  
service, as you say forever, - tell me do you think the Naval service is  
better off or worse than when you first entered it? 
Lord St. Vincent: Very much worse may it please Your Majesty. 
The King very quickly: How so? How so? 
Lord St. Vincent: Sire, I have always thought that a sprinkling of nobility was  
very desirable in the Navy, as it gives some sort of consequence to the  
service; but at present the Navy is so overrun by the younger branches of  
nobility, and the sons of Members of Parliament, and they swallow up all  
the patronage, and so choke the channel to promotion, that the son of an  
old Officer, however meritorious both their services may have been, has  
little or no chance of getting on. 
The King: Pray who was serving Captain of the Fleet under your Lordship? 
Lord St. Vincent: Rear Admiral Osborne, Sire, the son of an old Officer. 
The King: Osborne! Osborne! I think there are many more than one of that name  
Admirals. 
Lord St Vincent: Yes Sire, there are three brothers, all Admirals. 
The King: Thats pretty well for democracy, I think. 
Lord St. Vincent: Sire, - the father of these officers served twenty years as First  
Lieutenant, with my dear friend Admiral Barrington, who had never  
sufficient interest to get him beyond the rank of Commander. He was of 
necessity obliged to send all his sons to sea, and to my knowledge, they  
never had anything more to live on than their pay . . . they got on in the  
service upon the strength of their own merits alone; and Sire, I hope Your  
Majesty will pardon me for saying, I would rather promote the son of an  
old deserving Officer than any Noble in the land. 
The King mused for a minute or two, and then said, I think youre right Lord St.  
Vincent, quite right.1 
 
As apocryphal as this account appears, it nonetheless reflects opinions 
representative of the feelings of both the former First Lord and his sovereign about the 
excess of aristocratic young men in the service and its adverse effect on an institution that 
traditionally represented a meritocracy. St. Vincent, however, took the point a step 
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beyond the issue of individual merit, suggesting that a naval pedigree ought take 
precedence over that of peerage.  
Lewis data on the social status of Royal Navy officers parents relative to 
promotion to flag rank testifies to St. Vincents concern. Between 1793 and 1815, sons of 
baronets and peers accounted for 12 percent of the total sample of 1800 officers while 
sons of professional men, those with naval, clerical, military, legal, civil, or medical 
connections, accounted for 50 percent. In the arena of promotion, however, nearly 41 
percent of baronets and peers advanced to Rear-Admirals rank or higher, while only 22 
percent of professional sons managed to achieve the same success.2 The desirability and 
prestige of a naval career, boosted by Prince William Henrys appearance as a 
quarterdeck boy, effectively began a constriction of opportunities for entry-level officers 
based on social rank, despite George IIIs ostensibly democratic ideals and nominal 
sympathies.  
Changing Selection 
Rodgers survey of the Royal Navy during the Seven Years War explores several 
avenues open to boys with ambitions to officer rank. Captains servants represented those 
boys of respectable families who entered not before the age of thirteen, or if a naval 
officers son, not before the age of eleven.3 This theoretically allowed a certain amount of 
general schooling and preparation in the navigational sciences before a young gentleman 
went to sea. In practice, boys joined the service years earlier, taking advantage of the fact 
that the Navy [of the 1760s] was the only profession for a gentleman that did not require 
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 indeed, did not admit  the application of money or influence.4 For aristocratic 
younger sons and the sons of impoverished nobility, as much as for sons of genteel, 
professional, and merchant families, adventure afloat presented an attractive option to the 
struggles of civilian life. For a small allowance, or in some cases no money at all, boys 
could embark on a respectable, if socially unglamorous profession. Over the next six 
years a boy might move between the ratings of able seaman, ordinary seaman, 
midshipman, and back to captains servant on the ships muster. Such ratings were 
meaningless in terms of shipboard duties, although they allowed a boy to gather the six 
years sea-experience required for eligibility to the lieutenants examination.  
The second method of rising to commissioned rank during the 1750s and 1760s 
began on the lower deck, with those boys whose ability allowed them to vault the ranks 
of warrant officers and land on the quarterdeck. This method harkened back to the 
Cromwellian practice of elevating competent seamen to the quarterdeck via the 
midshipmans berth. Throughout the Seven Years War lower-deck promotion remained 
a common practice.  
The final method of entry came via the merchant service. Experience gained in 
the East Indies, West Indies, or Baltic trades often presented young men with a chance to 
impress naval captains with their skill and seamanship and secure a place as a potential 
officer. In both the second and third instances, midshipmen and quarterdeck boys 
tended to be older and more practically experienced. Lieutenants passing certificates 
from 1759 reveal that 52 percent of young gentlemen passed their examination after six 
years of service; however, only 16 percent of the 192 men and boys passed that year 
entered the service at age fourteen. Twelve percent of applicants, the second largest 
                                                
4 Rodger, Wooden, pp. 253-54. 
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group, were twenty-five years old at the time of passing.5 This represents a significant 
number of older quarterdeck boys and suggests that a good proportion of would-be 
officers came from ratings other than that of captains servant. With so diverse a pool of 
hopefuls, the determining factor for success in each of these officer-entry cases was 
ability. In the era of Anson and Hawke the maxim of merit remained firm: without a 
good reputation for professional ability, even the well connected [boy] fared badly.6 
By the start of the French Revolutionary Wars, the field of officer entry had 
narrowed. The most popular age of entry remained fourteen, as six years experience with 
two of those years rated midshipmen or masters mate were still required in order to sit 
the lieutenants examination at the minimum age of twenty.7 A shift, however, towards a 
younger and more socially-elevated junior officer corps became apparent with the 1794 
Order in Council and with the relatively lower incidence of tarpaulin midshipmen. 
Lewis survey of officer entry shows that barely 3 percent of the total 3751 officers 
created between 1793 and 1815 came from the lower deck while 86 percent entered as 
quarterdeck boys in one form or another.8 In terms of age, 72 percent of the 285 
lieutenants passed in 1805 entered at or before age sixteen, with 86 percent spending 
between six and seven years at sea before sitting their examination.9 These figures reflect 
a younger group of candidates and a more concentrated selection and grooming process 
for young gentlemen. As Thomas Trotter, surgeon aboard HMS Terpsichore in 1802 
noted in his A Practical Plan for Manning the Navy: 
                                                
5 TNA: PRO ADM107/5, Lieutenants Passing Certificates, 1759. See Appendix D. 
6 Rodger, Wooden, pp. 263-64, 278. 
7 Lewis, Social, p. 160. Note: Lewis also acknowledged that no rule was more universally dodged than  
   this one of a Lieutenants minimum age. Examining captains absolved themselves of complicity in this  
   type of fraud by writing up passing certificates as the candidate appears to be rather than the  
   candidate is twenty years old. Ibid., p. 163.  
8 Ibid., pp. 146-47. 
9 TNA: PRO ADM107/32-33, Lieutenants Passing Certificates, 1805. See Appendix D. 
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No person will have the hardihood to contend that a seamans duty can be learned 
in less than seven years or after 21 years of age. He must be accustomed to it from 
boyhood, for no adult can ever be brought to endure the privation, dangers and 
hardships which are inseparable from a sea life.10 
 
In January 1806 the Admiralty under Charles Middleton, then Lord Barham, 
issued its new Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majestys Service at Sea, a 
series of orders that allowed greater Admiralty intervention in day to day shipboard 
activities including the management, if not the selection, of entry-level officers. The 
regulations initiated a move towards more centralized forms of naval governance and laid 
the foundations for future reforms which would, by 1815, eliminate the captains 
monopoly on the selection of potential officers. The direction of 1815 which stated that 
no Midshipman should be received on board and entered in the Ships Books unless or 
until he had received Admiralty Sanction,11 instituted centralized approval of all young 
gentlemen. This allowed the Lords Commissioners greater say in who came aboard His 
Majestys ships and provided a means of controlling both the quantity and quality of new 
recruits entering an already swollen officer corps.  
Of the 291 passed lieutenants in 1814, a year that saw a substantial number of 
ships paid off in anticipation of the peace, only 33 percent of midshipmen passed their six 
to seven years at sea before seeking commissioned status. The largest group by far, 47 
percent, spent only three and a half to five and a half years at sea before being allowed to 
sit the examination for lieutenant. Of these, more than 50 percent were fourteen years old 
or younger at their time of entry into the service.12 Despite the fact that the 1808 
Regulations and Instructions lowered the minimum age for the lieutenants examination 
                                                
10 Thomas Trotter, quoted in Brian Lavery, ed., Shipboard Life and Organization, 1731-1815, Navy 
    Records Society, Vol. 138 (Brookeflied, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 1998), p. xii. 
11 Lewis, Social, p. 159.   
12 TNA: PRO ADM107/46-47, Lieutenants Passing Certificates, 1814. See Appendix D. 
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to nineteen,13 the most likely explanation for this mass of rapid and youthful promotions 
during years of declining naval activity was the opportunity it afforded to retire young 
gentlemen with the consolations of commissioned rank and half-pay, a benefit to which 
midshipmen and volunteers were not entitled. This enabled the discreet removal of well-
connected but unpromising young gentlemen and provided an incentive for boys who 
lacked real commitment to a naval career to jump ship. Despite its costs to the 
government, promotion out relieved pressure on the narrow channel of promotion and 
ensured a moderate level of professionalism within the ranks of midshipmen and petty 
officers.  
 The trend that favored the sons of the patrician classes for volunteer appointments 
gained momentum in the peace-time navy after 1815. Lewis notes that of the 834 post-
war volunteers, 149, or nearly 18 percent, came from the ranks of peers and baronets.14 
This represented an increase of 6 percent from those who entered during the war years. 
When seen in relation to the size of the Royal Navy fleet, which shrank dramatically over 
the twenty years from 1810 to 1830, the proportion of volunteer positions being awarded 
to young Honorables increased significantly.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 TNA: PRO ADM7/971 Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majestys Service at Sea, 1808,   
    Sect. VI, Ch. II, Art. IX. The age change was initiated by an Order in Council, 4 July, 1805. See PRO  
    ADM1/5215, Ch. II, Article IX.   
14 Michael Lewis, The Navy in Transition: A Social History, 1814-1864 (London: Hodder and Stoughton,  
    1965), p. 22. 
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Table 3. Royal Navy Fleets by Year 
 1760 1790 1795 1800 1804* 1805 1810 1815 1820 1830 
SOTL 135 130 123 127 88 136 152 126 112 82 
Cruisers 115 130 160 158 138 160 183 151 101 100 
Small ships 51 16 28 43 - 33 63 73 35 35 
Total 301 276 311 328 226* 329 398 350 248 217 
Sources: Jan Glete, Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies, and State Building in Europe and America,  
1500-1860, Vol. II (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1993), pp. 552-55. 1804 figures (*) are drawn from 
Rodger, Command, pp. 615-17, and reflect St. Vincents decommissioning efforts during the Peace of 
Amiens. 
Notes: SOTL= ships of the line and 50s up until 1790, Cruisers= frigates and 50s after 1790, Small 
ships=vessels 300-500 tons until 1790, 500-1000 tons after 1790. This category does not include sloops, 
brigs, bomb vessels, schooners or cutters. Gletes figures do not distinguish between ships on active service 
and those in ordinary preparing for sea.  
 
As the number of positions for officer candidates dwindled in the years after 
Waterloo, competition for a place in the midshipmans berth mounted. The political and 
social elites added their weight to the pressure bearing down on both individual captains 
and the Board of Admiralty. The result was a continued gentrification of the 
quarterdeck, a move that testified to the pervasive sense of old-order social values within 
the naval hierarchy.   
 In summary, the trend evidenced between the Seven Years War and the 
Napoleonic Wars saw a younger, more gentlemanly group of quarterdeck boys eligible 
for officer status. Although the gentrification of the midshipmans berth began as a result 
of selections made by individual captains, the outcome represented a gradual process of 
Admiralty incursion upon the ultimate expression of a captains power  patronage. It 
also represented a move towards centralized control of personnel matters.15 In the social 
polarization of its officer corps and in the escalation of Admiralty control, which further 
strengthened the position of the Lords Commissioners as players in wider political 
                                                
15 Lewis, Social, p. 159. 
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spheres, the Royal Navy assumed the characteristics of an ancien régime. Rodger 
expresses the change as a division [that] was slowly opening along a fault-line . . . 
between those who were gentlemen by birth and those who were not. The trend 
reinforced old systems of social precedence and patrician hegemony and cultivated the 
division of social rank that was to become the central organizing principle of the ranks 
and ratings of the Navy after 1815.16 
Sobriety, Diligence and Qualifications  the Ideal Young Gentleman 
In 1787 Captain Cuthbert Collingwood wrote to a hopeful young officer, O. M. 
Lane, dispensing his advice on a naval career: 
you may depend on it, that it is more in your power than in anyone elses [sic] to 
promote both your comfort and advancement. A strict unwearied attention to your 
duty, and a complaisant and respectful behaviour, not only to your superiors, but 
to every body, will ensure you their regard, and the reward will surely come, and I 
hope soon, in the shape of preferment. . . . Let it be your ambition to be foremost 
on all duty. Do not be a nice observer of turns, but present yourself ready for 
everything. . . . Let your companions be such as yourself, or superior; for the 
worth of a man will always be ruled by that of his company. . . . Read  let me 
charge you to read. Study books that treat of your profession and of history . . . 
Remember Lane, before you are five and twenty, you must establish a character 
that will serve you all your life.17 
 
Collingwoods advice touched on the most important factors determining the success of 
quarterdeck boys in the Royal Navy after the Seven Years War including education, 
temperament, conduct, and perhaps most importantly, connections. In practice, and 
perhaps contrary to Collingwoods intentions, the first three of these factors tended to 
reinforce the importance of the latter and contributed to the advent of a more genteel 
midshipmans berth. Gentlemanly conduct became a proxy for merit replacing, or at least 
                                                
16 Rodger, Command, p. 527. 
17 Cuthbert Collingwood to O. M. Lane, London, November 7, 1787, in Newnham Collingwood,  
    Correspondence, Vol. I, pp. 18-20. 
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standing alongside, the Sobriety, Diligence, and Qualifications18 traditionally 
demanded of a quarterdeck boy and justifying the rapid pace of promotion for boys of 
noble or high rank. Such allowances further supported impressions of a Royal Navy 
devoted to maintaining the bulwarks of a patrician state.  
Connections, Interest and Patronage  
When it came to appointing young gentlemen and overseeing their advancement, 
Collingwoods faith in reward based on merit marked him as a member of the old school. 
During the American War of Independence, Lord Sandwich famously distributed 
appointments and promotions with remarkable impartiality to political and even royal 
interest. In 1760 Sandwich responded to Lord Berkleys protests over the denial of his 
brothers claims to promotion: . . . there are many young men of fashion in the Navy 
who are equally solicitous of preferment and their friends are equally pressing; your 
Lordship will find on enquiry that my answer to all of them is the same, whatever their 
connections may be. In a final dig, Sandwich raised the issue of performance: . . . if 
Captain Berkley wishes to get out of his Fireship into an active Sloop in order to have a 
greater probability of distinguishing himself, I shall very readily accommodate him when 
a proper opening happens. . . .19 As First Lord, Sandwich exhibited considerable loyalty 
to naval tradition, placing seniority and the merits of distinguished service ahead of 
aristocratic and political influence.  
By the next round of conflict, however, few of Sandwichs like-minded followers 
remained. In 1809 Collingwood stood virtually alone in his advocacy of merit over 
interest and was well aware of the oddity of his convictions: You may have heard that I 
                                                
18 TNA: PRO ADM 107/32, extract from a certificate issued by the Navy Board in 1805, confirming a  
    young gentlemans credentials and his eligibility to sit the Examination for Lieutenant. 
19 NMM SAN/V/13, Lord Sandwich to Lord Berkley, written between February 16 and April 13, 1760. 
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am reckoned rather queer in the promotion of young men. I advance a great many who 
have not a friend to speak for them, while those I respect most in the world sometimes 
plead in vain.20 This statement, penned just a year before Collingwoods death, perhaps 
reflected not a little contempt for the omnipotence of the Admiralty board, which denied 
his repeated requests to be retired from command of the Mediterranean Fleet. Rebellious 
attitudes amongst captains towards the prevailing political winds were, however, far from 
the norm. By the start of the French Revolutionary Wars the lure of political, financial, 
and/or social gain to be had from the acceptance of well-connected boys, turned the heads 
of most naval commanders capable of wielding patronage. This, combined with 
increasing Admiralty interference in the appointment process, limited the field of eligible 
boys considerably. Even Nelson, for all his celebrated flouting of regulations, was not 
immune to pressure from above. To the Right Honorable William Windham who 
solicited favor on behalf of a friends son, Nelson wrote, . . . it is a fact although I can 
hardly believe it that I am unable to send a Lad to Sea, the refusals I receive from the 
Admiralty filling up every vacancy astonish me. . . .21 To a fellow admiral Nelson 
expressed similar anxieties in the wake of moves to centralize Admiralty control over 
appointments and promotions: 
I will explain to you exactly my power of promotion and you will then see the 
very distant prospect I can have of obliging my friends. All Admiralty vacancies 
are filled up by the First Lord of the Admiralty as by List given me. Nothing is 
left to a Commander In Chief of the Present day but Deaths & dismissals by Court 
Martials [sic]. . . .22 
 
 
                                                
20 Max Adams, Trafalgars Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of Napoleon (Hoboken,  
    NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2005), pp. 21-22. 
21 Lord Nelson to The Rt. Hon. William Windham, November 20, 1802, in Colin White, ed., Nelson: The  
    New Letters (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: Boydell Press, 2005), p. 83. 
22 Lord Nelson to Admiral Roddam, November 5, 1804, in White, New Letters, p. 84. 
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Who then, managed a spot on this privileged list? Even prior to the start of the 
French Revolutionary Wars, the roll sagged with social weight. Admiral Sir William 
Henry Dillon, a notorious snob, remarked in his memoirs on the number of notables 
present aboard HMS Alcide in 1790, where he entered as a captains servant at the age of 
ten: It was a truly pleasing circumstance to me to find that most of these young 
gentlemen were highly connected  the names of some of them will satisfy you, such as 
Byng, Herbert, Digby, Pigot and Ayscough.23 The aristocratic and naval-political 
connections of these young men reflected the growing outside influence upon the 
Admiralty board in the last decades of the century.  
St. Vincent, as First Lord of the Admiralty from February 1801 to May 1804, 
castigated his predecessor, the 2nd Earl Spencer, for his shameless use of patronage and 
his abuse of the appointment process as a means of satisfying family and friends. Such 
rectitude, however, did not take precedence over St. Vincents Whig politics or extend to 
his own relations. To the commander-in-chief of the North American station he wrote:  
This will be delivered to you by Captain Fane of the Driver, son of Mr Fane, 
Member of the County of Oxford, who is sent out to you with a view to his being 
promoted to the rank of post-captain . . . Captain Fane is a near relation of mine 
and every way worthy of your good offices and protection.24 
 
When it came to dealing with the budding career of a listed candidate such as the son 
 
of Lord Radstock, Nelsons tone, too, was much altered: 
  
Relative to your Son . . . you may rely my Dear Lord that I will take the earliest 
opportunity after he has served his time of promoting him, if we do not take 
particular care of the children of our Brethren we should assume to be reprobated 
                                                
23 Dillon, Adventures, Vol. I, p. 21. Note: Lewis concludes that William Henry Dillon was in all likelihood  
    the bastard son of Sir John Talbot Dillon, Baron of the Holy Roman Empire, D.S.P. This hereditary title  
    did not pass to William but to his cousin, John Joseph Dillon. William Henry assumed the title of Sir  
    anyway. Ibid., pp. x, xvi. 
24 Lord St. Vincent, quoted in Rodger, Command, p. 517. 
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and when those Children come with more merit than others they have a double 
claim to our notice.25 
 
Nelson redeemed such blatant sycophancy with the justification of merit. Nominally, 
merit remained the distinguishing feature between the use of patronage in the army and in 
the Royal Navy. But while proof of ones ability remained an important factor in the 
promotion of sea officers, it played little or no role in the appointment of young 
gentlemen whose age and inexperience allowed small opportunity to prove themselves 
through service. Boys over the age of thirteen were, however, expected to bring with 
them knowledge of navigation and mathematics, skills that marked them for command. 
Yet even boys from the pinnacle of educated society often lacked such fundamental 
training. Admiral Lord Thomas Cochrane lamented the incompetence of elite quarterdeck 
recruits: . . . of the many [young] officers furnished to me through parliamentary 
influence, it can be only said that they were seldom trusted . . . I considered it preferable, 
on pressing occasions, to do their duty myself. . . .26 But for all the social and political 
pressure exerted on the Admiralty, and consequently forced down the chain of command, 
the skills of basic seamanship remained crucial to the effectiveness of a budding officer. 
Without a minimal level of professional ability on the quarterdeck, the Royal Navy might 
have collapsed under the weight of its own incompetence. Self-preservation forced a 
certain moderation in the Royal Navys promotion of young gentlemen who were also 
backed by powerful interest. As unwieldy as the problem of over-mighty, under-trained 
young gentlemen might have appeared to traditionalists such as Collingwood, St. 
Vincent, and Nelson, who generally valued merit above all, the Royal Navy never 
endured the kind of patronage plague that infected land-based military institutions. As 
                                                
25 Lord Nelson to the Rt. Hon. Lord Radstock, October 13, 1803, in White, New Letters, p. 93. 
26 Cochrane, Autobiography, p. 22. 
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Lewis notes of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century navy, it must be 
admitted that merit always counted for something, though not for so much as it should.27 
The Three Rs 
 During the course of the Great Wars, opportunities for entry-level officers 
narrowed to those with more formal academic foundations. The days of young, 
unschooled officers such as Ramblin Jacks Captain John Cremer, who began his sea-
career in 1708 and prospered in the service for nearly seventy years thereafter, were over 
by the start of the French Revolutionary Wars. While Bellamys comment in the 
introduction to Cremers journal smacks of anachronistic bias  A man so astonishing in 
his orthography would [in 1936] hardly be allowed to become a police constable, let 
alone a master mariner28  it is a judgment that gained currency in the Royal Navy of the 
late-eighteenth century. As a ten year-old youngster in his first appointment, Dillon 
recalled with pride his introduction to Captain Sir Andrew Douglas of the Alcide, who 
expressed delight when I told him that I had partly been educated in France, whereupon 
Sir Andrew made a few observations on the necessity of naval officers being familiar 
with foreign languages.29 Poor Cremer was only loosely familiar with his native English.  
Dillon had been well-schooled at an early age, although his education did not end 
when he came aboard Alcide. The ships schoolmaster, Mr. Humphreys, conducted 
classes in navigation and general studies, from 9 oclock in the morning till 12: [and] in 
the afternoon from 2 till 4.30 Contrary to the general impression cast by Humphreys less 
                                                
27 Michael Lewis, intro. to A Narrative of My Professional Adventures, by Sir William Henry Dillon,  
    Vol. I, p. 5. 
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30 Ibid., p. 22.  
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rigorous contemporaries, he performed his pedagogical duties with skill and diligence. 
The author of the diary from HMS Gibraltar in 1811 appeared to be the tutor (and 
brother) of Frederick Gilly, a fifteen year-old midshipman. The tutors efforts represented 
the more haphazard type of education available to young gentlemen aboard ship. His 
entry of May 20 noted:  
Wrote out some mathematics for Frederick and at first endeavoured to instruct 
him in that branch of knowledge, but as I found he could make little [progress?] 
without the necessary books, I gave it up and substituted geography in its  
place . . . and found that he made every improvement I could wish. . . . 31 
 
Mr. Macbride, the schoolmaster of the seventy-four gun Edgar in 1787, was a drunken 
and obscene man who inspired little scholastic progress among the midshipmen in his 
charge but did provide them with a subject for lampoons and practical jokes.32 Despite 
the sometimes dubious advantages of a tutor at sea, naval schoolmasters were rare, even 
by the close of the eighteenth century, appearing primarily in first rates and flag ships.33 
Not until 1806 did the service make warrant-officer status available to schoolmasters, 
thus encouraging a higher caliber of instructor to enlist and making practicable the 
instruction of boys at sea. For the most part, however, young gentlemen were better off in 
shore-based schools which offered skilled instructors and a greater scope of study. 
Lord Cochrane entered the service in 1793 as a midshipman at the ripe age of 
seventeen. While his maturity obviated the need for extensive shipboard schooling, the 
first chapter of Cochranes autobiography is a meticulous chronicle of his education 
relative to the changing fortunes of his family. From private French tutors, to instruction 
                                                
31 National Maritime Museum, UK: JOD/148, Diary of a Midshipman Pysent. The title of this  
    manuscript is misleading as the author, though unnamed, reveals himself to be the brother and shipboard  
    tutor of Frederick. Lavery concluded the subject of the diary was Midshipman Frederick Gilly,  
    Shipboard, p. 459. 
32 Gardner, Recollections, ed. Hamilton, p. xvi. 
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in the military sciences by retired army sergeants, to a spell at Mr. Chauvets excellent 
school in Kensington, Cochrane made clear the high value ascribed to education among 
naval officers in the last decade of the eighteenth century.34  
The trend towards preparing boys with educations relevant to a career as a naval 
officer can be traced to Charles IIs foundation of Christs Hospital School for the Navy. 
Established in 1673 to train 40 poor boys . . . in the art of navigation,35 such altruism on 
behalf of the underprivileged, in fact, ran contrary to the new centurys attempts to raise 
the social status of naval officers. The Royal Naval Academy opened to students in 
Portsmouth in 173336 with the express purpose of raising crops of aristocratic or 
gentlemanly young officers. Limited to forty places, the Academy cost between ₤70 and 
₤80 a year, too rich for the vast majority of the middling sort. Measures were taken in 
later years, however, to open fifteen of these positions to the sons of naval officers.  
Poor administration and an equally poor reputation for turning out ignorant young 
debauchers meant that the Academy was rarely full and subsequently had little impact 
on the Navy as a whole.37 Expansion and reform of school operations in the 1790s saw 
some improvement in the proficiency of its graduates. Of the 288 passed lieutenants for 
1805, 10 entered the service as scholars, receiving between two and four and a half years 
sea-time credit while at school.38 These small numbers justified assessments past and 
present, that the total impact of the Academy on the service was negligible. St. Vincents 
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opinion of the school as a sink of vice and abomination39 did not improve with time. 
Re-christened in 1806 as the Royal Naval College, the schools capacity increased to 
seventy students.40 The effort, however, proved to be too little too late in a navy with less 
than ten years of the war left to run.  
Most quarterdeck boys were expected to come aboard with a suitable general 
education in reading, writing, mathematics, trigonometry, and the rudiments of 
navigation as captains recognized the difficulty of perfecting such disciplines amidst the 
distractions of a ship. Boys were encouraged to take leave of their ship for a year or two 
between the ages of twelve and fourteen in order to refine their education ashore. James 
Anthony Gardner left HMS Conqueror at the age of seven to go to school ashore, having 
entered the service at age five.41 While at school a boys sea time continued to accrue 
such that they returned to their ships with no loss of seniority. Armed with a solid 
grounding in navigation, perfection of the art continued aboard ship, under the guidance 
of a captain or first lieutenant. Even as an admiral, Collingwood paid particular attention 
to the scholastic progress of the boys in his charge. To his friend J. E. Blackett, he wrote:  
Young _____ appears to me to be a very good, mild-tempered boy, and I will 
leave nothing undone which is in my power to promote his knowledge and 
interests. He is studying geometry with me, and I keep him close to his books. It 
is a pity, as he was not intended for the sea-service, that he has not been taught 
navigation; but I will at least prepare him for a better master.42 
 
As the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars progressed, pressure from the twin 
forces of politics and patronage mounted, resulting in the appearance of aristocratic boys 
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on quarterdecks throughout the Royal Navy who possessed little or no maritime 
schooling. In 1801 Collingwood addressed the shortcomings of one young gentleman 
proffered by his friend Mrs. Moutray: 
He is as well-bred, gentlemanly a young man as can be, and I dare say an 
excellent fox hunter, for he seems skilful in horses, dogs, foxes and such animals. 
But unluckily . . . these are branches of knowledge not very useful at sea, we do 
not profit by them off Ushant.43 
 
A year later Collingwoods problems with young gentlemen continued. In another letter  
 
to Blackett he complained: 
  
I was surprised to see Mr _____ come out again. They think, when they have 
served six years at sea, they should be made Lieutenants, and never deem it 
necessary to qualify themselves. He is a good, quiet young man, and walks about 
doing no harm; but he has no activity in him. Such people become pensioners 
upon the Navy, rather than officers in it.44 
 
Despite such cases, the increasing emphasis on high educational standards for future 
officers stemmed from two necessities. The first reflected the need for greater 
competency not only in seamanship and navigation but in the administrative duties of 
midshipmen and quarterdeck boys. Since the circulation of Lord Howes order book for 
HMS Magnanime in 1759, 45 the responsibilities of midshipmen had expanded to include 
management of watch, station, and quarter bills for a sub-division and accountability for 
the slops (clothing), personal property, and the cleanliness of the men, the details of 
which were to be recorded in accurate and legible reports. By the later years of the 
Napoleonic Wars the educational demands were even greater. Between 1811 and 1815,  
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Captain Cumby of the Hyperion required that midshipmen 
 send in to the Captain each day, at sea, as soon as may be after noon, their own  
account, of the ships way and position as ascertained by log, chronometer and  
lunar observation. The latter methods of measuring longitude are most earnestly  
recommended to the constant practice and attention of all the Mates and  
Midshipmen, as a branch of professional knowledge not only highly creditable,  
but absolutely and indispensably necessary to the character of a British Naval  
Officer.46   
 
The second need fulfilled by a corps of educated junior officers was the 
preservation of the quarterdeck as the realm of the gentleman. Education generally 
provided the dividing line between gentility and the rest. As a function of wider social 
issues, education merged with perceptions of genteel behaviour equating the two, often 
wrongly, with a temperament suitable for a sea officer.  
Temperament, Conduct, and the Appearance of a Gentleman 
 One of the consequences of heading to sea at a very young age was that boys, 
even aristocratic ones, seldom received the kind of polish that could be acquired ashore, 
such that polite society was apt to view the sea-officers with some disdain.47 Nelsons 
advice to Emma Hamiltons cousin Charles Conner upon his being rated midshipman in 
the Niger, reiterated the need to uphold a code of conduct indicative of the naval officers 
desired image: I trust that your future conduct in life will prove you both an officer and 
a gentleman. Recollect that you must be a seaman to be an officer, and also, you cannot 
be a good officer without being a gentleman.48  
 Wise words, though what lasting impact they effected on a scrum of prematurely-
empowered teenage boys is doubtful. John Harvey Boteler, a gentlemans son who went 
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to sea in 1808 at the age of twelve, recounted a series of scrapes involving the thrashing 
of bullying fellow midshipmen, the theft of his captains fresh-boiled plum pudding, and 
the smashing of the pursers store of lanterns as retribution for the miserable dips we 
were allowed for lighting the berth.49 Dillon, too, recounted scenes of Gun Room cutlass 
duels and quarterdeck fisticuffs with bullying midshipmen, although his more genteel 
sensibilities were thoroughly offended by the scenes of licentiousness, drunkenness, 
swearing and immorality to which I could not help being a witness.50  
Drunkenness presented a paradox in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century 
society and within the Royal Navy itself. Cochrane boasted never in my life to have 
been inebriated, while simultaneously remarking that those were days [1797-98] when 
even gentlemen did not consider it a demerit to drink hard.51 Nor, at least in naval terms, 
was it inappropriate to start young. Lord Bernard Coleridge writing to his father at age 
eleven remarked that wine is no luxury to me, for I have two glasses at dinner every day 
and two at supper, which is my half allowance, I not liking grog.52 Coleridge was 
fortunate to have had an option in his choice of beverage. Even Captain James Gambier, 
or Preaching Jemmy as he came to be styled by seamen resentful of his dogmatic 
Methodism, allowed a most uncharacteristic splicing of the main-brace at Christmas 
1793, whereby virtually every man and boy aboard the seventy-four gun Defence became 
blind drunk.53 A mariners access to beer, wine, and spirits, guaranteed by ancient naval 
                                                
49 Boteler, Recollections, pp. 32-34. 
50 Dillon, Adventures, Vol. I, p. 14. 
51 Cochrane, Autobiography, p. 25. 
52 Lord Coleridge to his Father, 1804(?), quoted in Rodger, Command, p. 394. 
53 Dillon, Adventures, Vol. I, p. 102.  
  46
traditions,54 sadly outlasted the general middle-class tolerance for drunkenness. 
Increasingly popular evangelical religious movements also lauded the merits of 
temperance, equating sobriety with superior moral standards and thereby appealing to all 
those with at least pretensions to gentility.  
The Royal Navy of the Napoleonic Wars, still smarting from the mutinies of 
1797, adopted harder lines on excessive drinking as a means of effecting greater control 
over a ships company. Captain Edward Codringtons Black List from HMS Blake in 
1812-13 recorded 122 crimes of drunkenness and repeated drunkenness out of a total of 
174. The most popular punishment meted out for these defaulters was twelve to twenty-
four lashes.55 Young gentlemen who overindulged, even wealthy, well-connected ones, 
were seldom tolerated. Boys deemed incurable gin-soaks often found themselves turned 
out of their ship or quietly dismissed from the service. Robert Wilson recorded in his 
journal on New Years Eve, 1806, the case of a fellow midshipman, Mr. Litchfield, 
whose over-imbibing earned him a ticket home from the American station:  
He [Litchfield] had been but a little time back, severely punished for intoxication  
and behaving himself in an ungentleman-like manner, repeatedly; he was but a  
youth, and Captain Campbell wished to get him home, for he found remonstrating  
with him was in vain.56  
 
Summaries of courts martial for quarterdeck boys, midshipmen, and acting-lieutenants 
from 1794 to 1815,57 however, reveal a relatively low incidence of charges for 
drunkenness testifying, perhaps in part, to a growing perception that temperance marked 
the gentleman, at least on the quarterdeck.   
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 In the opinions of some senior commanders, there were far worse shortcomings 
than drunkenness and youthful mischief. Collingwood valued qualities of temperament 
and self-motivation that predisposed a boy to life as a sea officer. To his sister Mrs. Stead 
he complained:  
Mrs Currels son never can be a sailor: he has something very odd in his manner, 
or rather he has no manner at all, but saunters a melancholic for a week together, 
unnoticing and unnoticed, except when I give him a little rally to make his blood 
circulate . . . It is a pity [his mother] had not put him apprentice to Jno. Wilson, 
the apothecary . . . His gravity would have established his reputation as a learned 
doctor, and if he did poison an old woman now and then, better to do that than 
drown an entire ships company at a dash by running on the rocks.58 
 
Without the spirit and fortitude for a naval career, a boys gentility and the virtues of his 
social rank mattered little to commanders like Collingwood. Young James Gardner 
recounted the instance of a fellow midshipman so terrified by the prospect of engagement 
that he ran from his quarters and positively hid in the coppers! and had put on the 
drummers jacket as a means of disguise. The offending midshipman got well flogged 
by the boatswain for his cowardice.59  
The initiative exhibited by fifteen year-old Frederick Gilly aboard the Gibraltar in 
1811 indicated a demeanor far more suitable for an officer. Determined to demonstrate 
his courage by participating in a potentially dangerous mission ashore, Frederick stowed 
away in one of the ships boats after a senior officer refused to include him in the landing 
party. Frederick revealed himself only after it was too late to return to the ship and fought 
bravely in the ensuing action amidst heavy musket fire.60 Although details of Fredericks 
parentage are unknown, his behaviour exemplified the kind of heroic and gentlemanly 
conduct expected of budding officers. A vigourous, oftentimes blind pursuit of honor, 
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regardless of the risks, set the standard for young gentlemen with a desire to rise in their 
profession, particularly if little interest could be called upon to boost their career.  
While it would be unfair and inaccurate to generalize that aristocratic young 
gentlemen exhibited less of the right stuff, resting instead on the laurels of influence, it 
is safe to argue that for those without interest the options were few. An anonymous young 
officer summed up the limitations for the unconnected: a fellow has now no chance of 
promotion unless he jumps into the muzzle of a gun and crawls out of the touchole 
[sic].61 Such a lament suggested that little or no outside influence favored this young 
gentleman, a shortcoming which left only one route to recognition  that of uncommon 
valor. In the years following Trafalgar the opportunity for displays of desperate 
service62 faded along with the grand fleet action and the last avenues to appointment by 
merit narrowed to a virtual impasse, clogged by social precedence and an infrastructure 
that supported the older order.  
 The economics of officer entry also reflected the narrowing opportunities for boys 
at sea. As captains servants, boys, and first class volunteers received no pay; families 
were expected to provide an allowance to cover a young mans messing, schooling (if a 
schoolmaster was present aboard ship), uniforms, and general expenses. The amount 
demanded for this allowance rose dramatically over the course of the century. In 1733 
five guineas sufficed a peers son who sought a position as a captains protégé, while in 
1748 John Jervis, who later became the Earl St. Vincent, was packed off with a mere ₤20. 
By the time William Dillon went to sea in 1790 his captain required a minimum 
allowance of ₤50 a year, a sum that allowed boys to live up to their gentlemanly 
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claims.63 Such an amount also eliminated a good number of potential recruits from the 
professional and lower orders. Without family interest in the form of Captain Maurice 
Suckling, who absorbed much of the expense, it is doubtful that Nelsons father, a 
Norfolk parson, could have raised the money to send his son to sea.64 Finances thus 
narrowed the field considerably and endowed a naval career with greater social prestige.   
It is interesting that Dillon, over the course of his memoirs from 1790 until about 
1796, mentioned frequently the gentlemanly nature of his messmates, but following his 
appointment to acting-lieutenant in 1796, noted a general falling off of gentility in the 
Royal Navys junior-officer corps. On this score Lewis suggests, It would perhaps be 
comforting to think that Dillon and his friends were on the way out, and that a more 
democratic officer entry was on its way in. But History does not bear this out.65 Perhaps 
a slightly older, more class-conscious66 Dillon began to register the difference between a 
gentleman by birth and connections, and one deemed so merely by manners and 
appearance. Dillons concern that naval officers ought possess, at the very least, a 
gentlemanly pedigree is indicative of the swing towards a narrower social field of 
opportunity. Dillon and his contemporaries represented the next generation of command 
beyond the self-made peers like Jervis, Nelson, and Collingwood. While the legacy of 
these heroic figures shaped conceptions of officer-like conduct and honor for generations 
to come, the tradition which automatically equated a lieutenants commission with 
genteel status now required qualification. For captains like Dillon, the future of the Royal 
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Navys officer corps relied as much on circumstances of birth as on suitability of 
temperament and conduct. Dillon saw the introduction of Admiralty nomination in 
1815 as a boon to the social integrity of the service rather than an infringement on what 
would then have been his own prerogative as captain: 
I was glad to find that some kind of regulation was to be enforced in that 
direction, as it was well known that many Captains had placed improper youths 
on the Quarter Decks of the Kings Ships. The Navy has much improved in 
consequence of that arrangement, and now you are nearly certain of having a 
young gentleman in the profession, whereas formerly there were many of very 
doubtful character in it.67 
 
Summary 
By the time of the French Revolutionary Wars the trend that had begun with 
Prince William Henrys admission into the service as a quarterdeck boy became a fully-
fledged movement, significant enough to draw the attention of many prominent naval 
commentators. The heightened social status of a naval career increased its popularity for 
the sons of aristocrats and the highest ranking gentlemen. While the Order in Council of 
1794 decreased the number of official positions for officers-in-training, limiting the entry 
of first class boys and volunteers to young gentlemen intended for sea service, demand 
for these positions multiplied. The result was a gradual but unmistakable rise in the 
proportion of entry-level positions being awarded to the sons of the social and political 
elite, a growth attested to by the number of Honorables passed as lieutenants in Steels 
Navy Lists of the period.68  
 The victims in this new social equation spanned the breadth of both social and 
naval ranks. While the Admiralty technically assumed no place in the selection and 
appointment of quarterdeck boys until 1815, captains found their prerogative squeezed 
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well before this time by social influences outside the navy and by political pressures 
forced down through the First Lord and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. 
Constraints on a captains freedom to appoint took their toll on those who, in the past, 
had been most favored  the sons of fellow officers and career warrants. Considering 
these boys most deserving by virtue of a fathers service, old-school captains like 
Collingwood continued to select boys from the professional ranks. But as the 
Admiralty maintained its slow but inexorable advance towards centralized control of 
appointments, even the most democratic commanders were forced to bow. By 1815 the 
transition from captains selection to Admiralty-approved nomination was complete, as 
was the process which facilitated the social polarization of the midshipmans berth. By 
the 1850s, the cockpit would be dominated by the sons of aristocrats and gentlemen.69 
The separation of the social orders  lower-deck commoners and quarterdeck gentlemen 
 remained a prominent feature of the late Georgian and Victorian navies.  
 In terms of broader social trends, the Royal Navys transition from a largely 
independent institution that thrived on its ability to subvert the order of traditional 
eighteenth-century society, to a centralized bureaucracy governed by forces from above, 
supports Clarkes theory of a continuing ancien régime. While the nature of the Royal 
Navy in the first half of the eighteenth century exemplified Langfords notion of an 
evolving social order, one which valued mobility and opportunity based on ability, such 
characteristics were permitted only by default. While the Royal Navy remained a socially 
undesirable profession-of-last-resort, the selection of young officers operated below the 
radar of the social elite. As soon as tastes and perceptions of a naval career changed, so 
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did the ability of the Royal Navy to maintain its independence in matters of appointment 
and advancement. As such, the demands of the old order triumphed despite the protracted 
death throes of a more egalitarian Royal Navy. As a gentlewoman and author with two 
brothers in active naval service, Jane Austen was well placed to observe high societys 
attitudes towards the opportunities afforded by the Royal Navy. In 1815 she captured one 
popular position in the voice of Sir Walter Elliott, Baronet. Elliott objected to the naval 
profession 
as being the means of bringing persons of obscure birth into undue distinction,  
and raising men to honours which their fathers and grandfathers never dreamt  
of . . . A man is in greater danger in the navy of being insulted by the rise of those  
whose father, his father might have disdained to speak to . . . than in any other  
line.70  
 
Such commentary reflected wider perceptions among members of the elite that favored 
even greater separation of the social orders. It was an opinion that William Dillon would 
have wholeheartedly supported.  
Clarks system of patrician hegemony, which allows flexibility and movement 
within the framework of an old social order, explains trends evident in the Royal Navy by 
the last quarter of the eighteenth century. In a profession which depended on skill for 
survival, advancement based on professional ability remained the central organizing 
principle of command. What changed, however, was opportunity. Precedence given to 
the sons of the elite in the competition for limited appointments brought a new crop of 
aristocratic and gentlemanly hopefuls into positions of naval command. For the new 
breed of quarterdeck boys, and for the majority of those they commanded, such a trend 
represented the ordinary extension of privileges to the natural leaders of society.
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PART II  THE AUTHORITY OF YOUNG GENTLEMEN 
The Evolution of Naval Authority in the Eighteenth Century 
 The wooden world of the late-seventeenth century was a far cry from the scenes 
of rigid discipline, professionalism, and cast-iron authority so evocative of Nelsons 
navy. At Lowestoft in 1666, the incompetent and unpopular Admiral Lord Buckingham 
begged his men not to throw him overboard and barely escaped with his life from several 
shipboard riots.1 At the opposite end of the scale, Thomas Masterman Hardy, Victorys 
captain at Trafalgar, proudly worked his ship in silence, directing his well-oiled human 
machine with hand signals and the occasional twittering of the boatswains call. Despite 
the unmistakable transition from a state of chaotic discipline to one of high-order 
efficiency, the Royal Navy continued to operate on a tenuous thread of authority that 
rested more on persuasion than force.2 The mathematics of shipboard life proved that 
consent was the crucial factor as eight hundred men could not be commanded by thirty or 
forty officers and boys without both tacit and explicit approval.  
The Admiralty of the previous century had demonstrated surprising obedience to 
the demands of its seamen, allowing them to dispose of captains who did not meet their 
professional standards, as in the Rainsborough mutiny of 1648.3 By the turn of the 
eighteenth century, such liberal attitudes towards mariners were largely extinct, although 
the potential threat posed by the lower deck remained foremost in the minds of all 
sensible commanders. The Admiraltys first attempt to codify discipline and standards of 
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duty came with the issue of the first General Printed Instructions4 in 1731. Additional 
Regulations and Instructions produced in 1733 and 1756 dealt increasingly with issues 
relating to the living conditions and work expectations of mariners and reflected concerns 
for the treatment of crews. The advent of Captains Order Books in 1759 brought to light 
the shortcomings of the Admiraltys instructions and emphasized the need for individual 
captains to clarify issues that affected daily life aboard ship. By the mid to late 1780s, 
concern for the treatment of seaman was evident in a number of order books including, 
rather surprisingly, those drafted by Prince William Henry, Duke of Clarence and captain 
of HMS Pegasus. Though a martinet on issues of protocol, discipline, dress, and 
cleanliness, Clarence demanded that no seamen, marine or other person in the ship is to 
be struck or otherways ill used on any pretence whatsoever by any officer or  
gentleman . . . and that . . . the people [an official term for a ships company] [are] 
never to be interrupted at their meals but on the most pressing occasions.5 Such orders 
were in wide circulation by the early 1790s and mirrored a general respect for the most 
basic rights of seamen.  
Yet the concessions proved insufficient to ameliorate the hardships facing 
mariners of the age. In 1797 tensions erupted in the greatest internal crisis of the 
eighteenth-century Royal Navy  the Spithead mutiny. Unlike its successor at the Nore, 
the mutineers of the Channel Fleet at Portsmouth achieved their aims with dignity, 
eloquence, and moderation, forcing those in positions of power to re-evaluate the 
capabilities of the average tar and the license granted to naval officers. The responses of 
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individual captains to the mutiny were, however, varied. St. Vincent reacted with 
characteristic ruthlessness, implementing a harsh system of discipline for both the men 
and officers.  
The severity of his methods did not suit captains and admirals who recognized 
more effective means of managing a ships company. Many noted that humane treatment 
of the men and a heightened consideration for their comfort often delivered more 
immediate and more enduring results. Concern for the use and abuse of seamen, 
particularly on the issue of their being called on deck unnecessarily, led Captain Keats of 
HMS Superb to order that the commanding officer is directed to avoid so much as 
possible the calling of all hands but when the service to be performed cannot be executed 
by the watch and idlers. . . .6 Directions of this nature were echoed in many order books 
of the period. Captain Anselm John Griffiths expanded upon such ideas in his 
Observations on Some Points of Seamanship written in 1811: 
Another thing which annoys the ships company is the calling of all hands for 
what the watch can do. They know as well as you do when there is a necessity and 
they come cheerfully when they see that necessity, but it is natural they should 
feel annoyed at being taken from their amusements or little private employments 
because an officer they ought to look up to either does not know what strength is 
requisite or is unmindful of their comfort.7 
 
Directives such as this reflected not only a heightened sensibility for the patience of 
lower-deck men but for the dangers of officers who appeared incompetent.  
 These examples of evolving attitudes towards the proper use of naval authority 
suggested a measure of change in the social dynamics of the shipboard hierarchy. In 
wider social terms, the effects of commercialism and an expanding middle class forced 
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the acceptance of more liberal attitudes towards the lower and middling orders. 
Radicalism in the form of revolutionary politics, leveling religion, and Romantic visions 
of the rights of man penetrated all strata of society, inspiring the lower orders as 
effectively as upper-class intellectuals. But the revolution in France proved too bloody 
for English tastes and the warnings of Edmund Burke resonated with terrible clarity.  
The mutinies of 1797 could hardly have been better timed to capitalize on a well-
matured sense of impending social doom brought about by the political threats from both 
Jacobins and the United Irishmen. Yet, the apolitical demands of the mutineers at 
Portsmouth suggested only a tepid challenge to the old order; while Admiralty 
negotiators downplayed the severity of the mutineers threat as a means of containing the 
potentially contagious ideas of rebellion which might infect other fleets and English 
society at large. As such, parties on both sides of the Spithead mutiny worked to preserve 
traditional social hierarchies, displaying what Clark describes as an unspoken solidarity 
in English conceptions of the kingdom and the role of its subjects. While conflict in a 
realm so economically and socially diverse was inevitable, the two pillars of English 
society, law and religion, combined to reaffirm the divine right of the elite to rule at sea 
and on land. The bloodless success of the Spithead mutiny arose from the moderation of 
the seamen involved, their deference to the authority of both the crown and the 
Admiralty, and a complete renunciation of political motives. Conversely, Parkers 
Floating Republic as the HMS Sandwich came to be known while under the control of 
Seaman Richard Parker (a disrated midshipman) during the Nore mutiny, failed utterly 
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and ended with Parker and twenty-seven of his collaborators hanged from the yardarm of 
their shattered Republic.8  
Other apparently progressive social measures such as the Duke of Clarences 
concern for his men at mealtimes, merely repeated the most fundamental of time-honored 
concessions awarded to Englands mariners and reflected the understanding that navies, 
as well as armies, fought on their stomachs. The liberal attitudes espoused by Anselm 
Griffiths did not undermine the authority of command but, in fact, encouraged higher 
standards of professionalism and honor among officers, thereby eliciting greater respect 
from the lower deck which cemented quarterdeck hegemony. As professional standards 
for officers sharpened with the onset of the Napoleonic Wars, the natural authority of 
aristocrats and gentlemen may have demanded polishing, but nonetheless emerged as the 
choice of British seamen. The opinion that the men preferred a smattering of gentility in 
their commanders9 echoed widespread contemporary beliefs in the old hierarchy, and the 
stability it represented. Such notions challenge Rodgers observation that the 1797 
Mutinies fundamentally changed the attitudes of officers and men throughout the  
Navy. . . .10 The trickle-down effect of these popular sentiments on the authority, both 
practical and theoretical, of midshipmen and quarterdeck boys is examined below.   
Quarterdeck Boys as a Measure of Change 
 Adjustments to Admiralty policy regarding the nature of command and the 
manner in which it wielded authority were best instituted at the entry level. As such, the 
authority granted to quarterdeck boys, the duties expected of them, and the bounds of 
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their acceptable behavior provided a telling measure of social climates. An examination 
of internal factors such as Admiralty regulations, orders set by individual captains, and 
the influence of the lower deck combined with a look at external factors including 
religion, politics, and education provides a fuller picture of the influences that affected 
the authority of quarterdeck boys. The play of internal and external factors appeared in 
characterizations of the new shipboard hierarchy  a structure that aligned more closely 
with its civilian counterpart as the Great Wars progressed. Despite fluctuations and 
challenges to the social order of the Royal Navy throughout the period, the social world 
aboard Georgian men-of-war, ultimately supported an ancien régime.   
Internal Sources of Authority  
The Admiralty 
A portion of a young gentlemans authority aboard ship resulted from Admiralty 
directives that reflected the policies of the Privy Council. Orders in Council addressing 
royal policy on naval manning and operational issues, as well as the demands of various 
First Lords and Admiralty boards, inspired various drafts of the Royal Navys 
Regulations and Instructions. The first edition in 1731 outlined the functions of 
midshipmen and quarterdeck boys and their status in the shipboard hierarchy in only the 
barest sense. The 1756 regulations attempted to clarify a young gentlemans status with 
the introduction of a uniform in order to their carrying the appearance which is 
necessary to distinguish their class to be in the rank of gentlemen, and give them better 
credit for executing the commands of their superior officers. . . .11 In the 1806 draft, 
midshipmen appeared to have moved beyond the insecurities associated with the 
appearance of authority, as the articles dealt primarily with expectations of their 
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competency as seamen, able to hand, reef and steer; as administrators, able to maintain 
accurate logs; and as leaders of men, responsible for the cleanliness, sobriety, 
proficiency, and general welfare of their sub-divisions.12  
Another source of authority from the top, which related to young gentlemen as 
much as to admirals, came from of the Articles of War. Established by the 
Commonwealth navy, amended by George II in 1747, and again in 1757, the Articles 
prescribed thirty-six points of law designed to accommodate all disciplinary 
contingencies, from drunkenness and insubordination to cowardice and murder. Articles 
19, 20, and 2213 addressed breaches of conduct with respect to shipboard hierarchies and 
cemented the authority of the quarterdeck, its boys included, with the threat of death 
looming over any lower-deck seaman or subordinate officer who dared rattle the chain of 
command.  
Both these sources protected the authority of young gentleman with the weight of 
law. As a cornerstone of English society, the immutability of these laws remained 
unquestioned, even by those who perished under their rule. During the Nore mutiny, one 
seaman decided to spare the life of young Lieutenant Nieven who had, the previous day 
sentenced the man to a flogging. The seaman explained his reasoning, You did, [flog 
me] Sir, but I deserved it. The rest of the seamans response spoke to wider social 
justifications: You are a gentleman, and a good officer. You never punished men but 
when they were in fault, and you did it as an officer ought to do. A flogging from a 
gentleman was clearly more acceptable than one from an officer such as the First 
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Lieutenant of the same ship who was a blackguard and no gentleman.14 Naval law 
typically passed without question, particularly when meted out by worthy possessors of 
the natural authority granted by aristocratic or gentlemanly birth. The system of authority 
handed down from the highest levels of Admiralty administration depended to a large 
extent on the elite status of the messenger. This fact further encouraged the practice of 
grooming the sons of noblemen and gentlemen to positions of shipboard power.   
Captains  
Beyond the general responsibilities outlined in the Regulations and Instructions 
and the legal protocol stated in the Articles of War, the functional duties and authority 
of midshipmen depended on the preferences of individual captains. In practical terms, 
expectations for the social and professional behaviour of quarterdeck boys rested almost 
entirely with a commander. Even as captains began to lose their monopoly on the 
selection of young gentlemen during the early stages of the French Revolutionary Wars, 
they retained practical jurisdiction over the boys in their charge. Decisions to pardon or 
punish, mentor or neglect, send a boy into deadly danger or keep him in relative safety 
below decks, all came down to the management style of individual captains. Peter Cullen 
Esq., surgeons mate aboard the frigate Squirrel, commented on the effectiveness of 
Captain Drurys husbandry, he was an excellent man for bringing up young gentlemen  
the midshipmen, for to be eminent officers in His Majestys Navy, and which many of 
them turned out to be.15 
Management style was often shaped by other factors including the ships rating 
which dictated the number of midshipmen aboard and the number of officers available to 
                                                
14 Cullen, Memoirs, pp. 84-85. Cullens italics. 
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supervise them, the vessels commission and cruising orders, and the age and competency 
of the boys themselves. As such, generalizations on the types of duties and the extent of 
authority granted young gentlemen are difficult to draw and contradictions abound.   
At fifteen John Harvey Boteler found himself second-in-command of a raiding 
party sent to destroy a flotilla of gunboats. His fellow officer was a daring boy, several 
years his junior, named Billy Hell Flames Lucas. Yet on other days, Boteler described 
his mates indulging in games of leap-frog, childish practical jokes, and frivolous pursuits, 
which, in the case of a young midshipman who fell and drowned while trying to catch a 
bird, could prove deadly.16 Dillon too, described the strange dichotomy of boys growing 
up aboard men-of-war. As a stunted and scrawny thirteen year-old midshipman, Dillon 
was forced to defend his ships watering boat from the predations of a group of Indiamen 
bent on ransacking his stores. Dillon followed the account of this adventure with a 
description of his messmates, including a fellow of the same age who still sucked his 
thumb.17 Captains standards for acceptable behaviour varied as widely as their methods 
of exacting complicity. Captain Edward Riou of the Amazon threatened dismissal from 
the service for young gentlemen who were idle or not continually acquiring some useful 
information,18 while the force of Collingwoods personality kept subordinates in check: 
. . . a look of displeasure from him was as bad as a dozen at the gangway from another 
man.19 
While the practice of putting boys to work at an early age was common enough in 
eighteenth-century England, the uniqueness of a career as a naval officer, which required 
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a rare combination of professional skill, book-learning, and understanding of human 
nature, appeared to place the pre-pubescent boy at a distinct disadvantage. Were it not for 
two factors  the belief that the only possible way to acclimatize to a naval life was to 
begin young and the high priority ascribed by the government to training naval officers as 
the front line of Englands defenses  the task might have been left to older recruits who 
no longer felt the need to shoot marbles on the poop deck in their spare time.20 
Collingwood recognized the flaws in the system: The fact is, that these boys are made 
Lieutenants too soon, and before their heads can bear their good fortune. It seems so easy 
to them that they do not set that value on their stations which they ought.21 Captains 
mitigated the problems caused by under-ripe, over-empowered juniors by weighing two 
factors in the authority equation  the capabilities of the individual and the tolerance of 
the ships company.  
While ability, initiative, and maturity counted for much in terms of the duties 
entrusted to young gentlemen, captains supported a boys authority as a natural right of 
those who walked the quarterdeck. In doing so they reaffirmed their own privileges of 
command. According to an early biographer, Collingwood used to tell the ships 
company that he was determined that the youngest midshipman should be obeyed as 
implicitly as himself, and that he should punish with great severity any instance to the 
contrary.22 Collingwood also understood the importance of teaching young officers to 
cope with the pressures of managing potentially explosive human-resource situations:  
When a mid. made a complaint [against a seaman], he [Collingwood] would order 
the man for punishment the next day; and in the interval, calling the boy down to 
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him, would say, In all probability the fault was yours; but whether or not, I am 
sure it would go to your heart to see a man old enough to be your father disgraced 
and punished on your account; and it will therefore give me a good opinion of 
your disposition, if, when he is brought out, you ask for his pardon. When this 
recommendation acting as it did like an order, was complied with, and the lad 
interceded for the prisoner, Captain Collingwood would make great apparent 
difficulty in yielding, but at length would say, This young gentlemen has pleaded 
so humanely for you, that in hope you will feel a due gratitude to him for his 
benevolence, I will for this time, overlook your offence.23  
 
The careful management of a boys authority, taking into account the qualities of the 
individual, the morale of the ships people, and the need to support the unquestioned 
authority of the quarterdeck, was essential in maintaining a man-of-wars social balance 
and operational effectiveness.   
 Captains could also set the tone for interactions between the lower deck and 
quarterdeck by determining how and when the line of separation was upheld. 
Quarterdeck boys and midshipmen, as hybrids of both ratings and officers, embodied the 
dividing line and all its ambiguities. Article 22 of the Articles of War promised death to 
any man who struck or threatened to strike a superior officer. In practice, this law 
extended even to touching a superior. Dillon, however, recorded that as a ten year-old 
captains servant aboard the seventy-four gun Saturn: . . . one or two of the seamen 
devoted themselves to me, and would often carry me in their arms to explain several parts 
of the ship in answer to my inquiries.24 No sailor who valued life would have dared take 
such liberties, even with a pint-sized officer, unless his captain explicitly authorized such 
behaviour. The Saturns Captain Linzee clearly saw some benefit in the interaction of 
gentlemanly youngsters and sea daddies, even when they came from the lower deck. 
James Gardner, too, recounted the story of Mr. Stack, a lower-deck man rated 
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midshipman to keep the boys in order as the father of our mess. Stack had an ugly 
way of showing his kindness. When in good temper (which was seldom) he would say 
My son, when he addressed any of us; but generally [it was], Ill split your ear.25 It is 
unlikely that such behavior would have been attempted, let alone tolerated, without a 
captains consent.  
 The authority transferred to quarterdeck boys by captains could therefore work in 
either direction, to separate young officers from the ships company or to assimilate them 
when appropriate. A captains ability to strike the right balance often determined the 
success of his junior officer corps and the smooth operation of his ship.    
The Lower Deck  
 More important perhaps than any source of authority from above, was that 
enabled by those below. According to the fundamental principles of old-order stability  
paternalism and deference  authority could be upheld only by widespread tacit and 
explicit support.26 The ability of midshipmen to carry out their duties rested equally on 
this principle. Young gentlemen as captains protégés represented the elite of shipboard 
society; their orders echoed the captains and therefore required equal attention. Seamen 
relied on the knowledge and expertise of those above, not only for their day to day safety 
in working the ship and steering a course, but for wartime decisions that would ensure the 
safety of their ship and their nation. On the opposite side of the relationship, the men 
were just as vital. Without the labor of hundreds of mariners, such complex war machines 
could not function. In this way, the strange dynamics of young and inexperienced boys 
commanding veteran able seamen was a prime example of the ancient social contract at 
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work  a contract based on mutual need. A midshipmans fair and respectful treatment of 
those before the mast fulfilled the unspoken agreement inherent in a society run on 
principles of patrician domination. Violation of this contract led not only to problems 
of morale but to a breakdown of the only immediate support mechanism available to 
officers  that of their men. William Robinson a.k.a. Jack Nastyface recounted the 
consequences of breaking this implicit bond. He described one rather sadistic twelve 
year-old midshipman: 
whose sole delight was to insult the feelings of the seamen and furnish pretexts to  
get them punished . . . I have often seen him get on the carriage of a gun, call a  
man to him, and kick him about the thighs and body, and with his fist would beat  
him about the head, and these, although prime seamen, at the same time dared not  
murmur.  
 
Retribution came with a savage engagement during which no mariner thought to look out 
for the boy. . . . [H]e was killed on the quarter-deck by a grape-shot, his body greatly 
mutilated, his entrails being driven and scattered against the larboard side. . . . Cheers 
accompanied news of the boys demise and, as Robinson noted, his death was hailed as 
the triumph over an enemy.27 This graphic depiction emphasized the fact that leadership 
existed and was maintained by the approval and support of those below. It also spoke to 
the consequences of unfulfilled paternalistic duties at the command level.  
 The ultimate expression of a breakdown in naval order came with the 1797 
mutinies. The uprising represented a labor strike in support of a pay raise (seamens 
wages had not increased since 1652), better quality victuals, improved conditions for the 
wounded, and amendments to the bounty system of recruitment which unfairly rewarded 
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those who avoided volunteering for as long as possible.28 The Spithead mutiny 
demonstrated that while lower-deck men displayed an extraordinary tolerance for neglect 
and ill-treatment, such virtues had their limit.  
H. G. Thursfield suggested other causal factors related directly to the 
disintegration of the paternalistic code.29 Three years earlier in 1794, a mutiny took place 
aboard Captain Thomas Troubridges Culloden, initiated by the crews belief in the 
unseaworthiness of their ship. Captain Thomas Pakenham quelled the uprising by 
promising, it was later rumored, that the mutineers would receive his protection and a full 
pardon for their actions. Five mutineers were, in fact, hanged, destroying the trust which 
formed an integral part of the naval relationship: . . . after this no seaman would believe 
an officers word of honour.30 The memory of this incident fuelled a belligerence in the 
Spithead mutineers, who calmly stated their ultimate loyalty to king and country and dug 
in their heels on the issues at hand.  
 The orderly and respectful conduct of the Spithead mutineers did, however, rouse 
the sympathies of Lord Bridport and the First Lord, Earl Spencer and brought 
concessions on most of the demands raised. Such rational behaviour also elicited a royal 
pardon which, after two weeks of negotiation, brought the Portsmouth mutiny to a 
peaceful end. In light of the volatile political climate circulating in England at the time, 
stirred by French Jacobins and United Irishmen, the success of a fleet-wide mutiny 
roused the passions of mariners and the fears of officers. Many captains now trod lightly 
on the quarterdeck, shy of exacting punishments for even the most unequivocal offences. 
Others, like St. Vincent, reacted with unflinching severity to any whisper of discord. The 
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result was a cleavage at the highest levels of naval operations, and a separation of the old 
and new philosophies of command and management of shipboard social hierarchies. 
Conservatives like Collingwood upheld the paternalistic code, believing that the best 
service he could do a body of men was to keep them well ordered and free of the need for 
independent thought on wider political and social matters. It has always been a maxim 
with me, wrote Collingwood, to engage and occupy my men, and to take such care for 
them that they should have nothing to think of for themselves, beyond the current 
business of the day.31 Such calm sentiments reflected none of St. Vincents iron-fisted 
reactionary discipline. Collingwood was famous for his disdain of corporal punishment 
and his demand for the respectful treatment of seamen, instructing young gentlemen that 
if you do not know a mans name call him sailor, and not you-sir and other such 
appellations; they are offensive and improper.32 Collingwoods respect for the average 
mariner nonetheless existed within the old seigneurial system, governed as it was by 
concepts of paternalism and deference. Yet, the mutinies managed to inspire subtle 
changes in the paternalistic system.   
By 1803 the storm created by the French terror, and Wolf Tone was all but spent 
although Rodger sees evidence of a long-term evolution in attitudes to naval discipline  
. . . matters which had been taken for granted before were now the subject of much 
thought and comment, by both officers and ratings. 33 Most significant was the mariners 
eagerness to demand that officers treat him with respect. New attitudes that gained 
popularity with more liberal captains promoted the British tar as a rational, professional, 
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mature creature, possessed of certain inalienable rights. By 1811 Captain Anselm 
Griffiths noted a transformation in the men serving aboard British men-of-war: Seamen 
are nowadays a thinking set of people and a large portion of them possess no 
inconsiderable share of common sense, the most useful sense after all. With respect to 
an officers authority he offered a thinly-veiled warning: 
[Seamen] are capable certainly of judging when they are well treated, whether  
those in authority over them exercise it with mildness and due attention to their 
comforts, and it is natural to suppose they sit lighter under the yoke of a man who 
they see knows and does his own duty. 34 
 
While Griffiths opinions might be interpreted as heralding a new naval order, his 
characterization of seamen as intelligent, skilled professionals also served another 
purpose, one that undermined notions of a fundamental social reform. Griffiths used such 
observations to demand more of those who walked the quarterdeck, both in terms of their 
respectful and gentlemanly treatment of inferiors and their professionalism. His criticism 
of officers conduct sought to push the standards of command higher, thereby widening 
the gap between quarterdeck and lower deck. Just as the principle of rule by consent 
remained firmly at the root of all naval authority, the need for officers to distance 
themselves from the men through genteel conduct, superior knowledge, and 
unquestionable skill reinforced the old paradigm and further justified the natural 
dominance of the patrician classes. The opening lines of Griffiths opus on the state of the 
Royal Navy in the new century summarized his position on the governance of a ships 
people and the distinction between the ranks: . . . I am not only a strenuous advocate for 
correct discipline, but a decided enemy to the littleness of character known by the 
                                                
34 Griffiths, Observations, p. 355. 
  69
appellation of courting popularity.35 A tightly ordered hierarchy remained central to 
Griffiths sense of modern command, while a heightened sense of formality in 
shipboard relationships supported notions of a continuing ancien régime. As Rodger 
notes, the senior officers of a generation before had been accustomed to a sort of rough 
intimacy with their men which had disappeared by the end of the century. . . .36 In this 
context, Griffiths theories can be seen less in terms of liberal innovation and more as a 
solution to the problem of changing social dynamics aboard men-of-war. His 
understanding of the modern seaman also suggested a process by which officers could, 
and should, distance themselves from a ships company.  
Young William Dillon provided evidence that even the new breed seaman 
supported notions of the natural superiority of noblemen and gentlemen. Dillon recalled 
an experience during his time as a midshipman in which seamen carried him and his 
comrades across mud flats on their backs to reach a stranded tender. He also convinced 
the men to carry out two French civilian prisoners who were almost entitled to the name 
of gentlemen. As Lewis notes, [Dillon] evidently took it for granted that he and his 
messmates would avoid muddy feet by being carried . . . and they were not 
disappointed. Gentility apparently also transcended nationality, and even war, and 
despite the initial protestations of the crew at having to render service to their enemies, 
the fact that the men complied only seems to show that, at heart, they also attached a 
great importance to the idea of gentility. Dillons example revealed little development 
towards a more democratic system of command. Lewis notes that, . . . any regret that his 
subordinates feet should become muddy while his remained clean were non existent,  
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. . . the much more modern conception of sharing discomfort with his men  simply did 
not enter his head at all.37  
By the time of the Great Wars, acceptance of a midshipman by a company of 
mariners often required a measure of gentility, whether by title, wealth, education or at 
the very least, appearance. Seamen were wary of midshipmen who had come in through 
the hawse-hole,38 as young men who had overstepped their bounds. Jealousies combined 
with a sense of lower-deck solidarity in the ultimate expression of an old-order mentality. 
A Mariner of Englands William Richardson hinted at his preference for a tightly ordered 
shipboard society: in all my experience at sea I have found seamen grateful for good 
usage, and yet they like to see subordination kept up as they know the duty could not be 
carried on without it.39 As late as 1847, Seaman John Bechervaise wrote of his faith in 
professionalism and a strict hierarchy of naval order:  
I would always choose a ship in which every duty was attended to strictly, in 
preference to one in which a man did almost as he liked. Indeed, Ive frequently 
heard old seamen say (when two ships were in commission and both wanting 
hands), Ill go with Captain _____: hes a taut one, but he is Captain of his own 
ship.40 
  
The demand for greater standards of professionalism amongst quarterdeck boys 
addressed another potential source of authority from the lower deck. Earning the respect 
of a crew through displays of courage, intelligence, professional skill, and/or effective 
leadership offered one of the surest roads to success and promotion. In this formula, 
Rodger notes the social paradox underlying the naval hierarchy. Traditionally, 
gentlemen were the natural leaders of society because of who they were, not what they 
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had learned. But naval authority also required a high level of professional skill. Young 
gentlemen who had been taught common skills like knotting and splicing by common 
seamen, were unusual creatures in eighteenth-century society.41 Within naval culture, 
however, proficiency was expected of junior officers regardless of their social pedigree as 
it determined the extent of practical authority accorded a young gentleman by the 
mariners in his charge. Authority as the sum of natural rights and professional merit 
characterized the Royal Navys command structure throughout the Great Wars and 
reflected the basis of a new underlying ideal, one in which duty was beginning to 
infiltrate the concept of honour.42 In this is evidence of Clarks concept of social 
flexibility and the ability of patrician society to absorb changes in order to reinforce its 
dominance. The more conscientious attitudes adopted by officers and midshipmen 
towards their inferiors in the early years of the nineteenth century reaffirmed the old 
standards of paternal duty, from which young gentlemen reaped the rewards of 
heightened loyalty and respect from the lower deck.  
The Rouges March  
Amendments to the system of naval punishment also reflected more enlightened 
approaches to authority and discipline. The Regulations and Instructions of 1806 
abolished the gauntlet, a punishment that required a ships company to whip an 
offender with knotted ropes as he walked past each man in succession. In 1809 the 
Admiralty forbade starting, the practice of striking crewmen for minor offences or to 
speed their work. Although this particular punishment continued in some ships, the 
official position on corporal brutality spoke volumes to the changing dynamics of 
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shipboard life. Samples of court martial records from the Seven Years War through the 
French Revolutionary Wars show that the men particularly resented being struck by 
midshipmen,43 as starting and beating were common complaints brought against young 
gentlemen and petty officers. Seaman William Russell was absolved of further 
punishment for a charge of mutiny against Midshipman Henry Rycraft, in consideration 
of the Blows he received from the Petty Officer.44 Rycraft had, in fact, beaten the 
seaman repeatedly about the head and face causing him to fall and injure himself further. 
In 1761 Seaman Thomas Smith accused Midshipman Ireland of the Hampton Court of 
verbally abusing him and striking him with a rattan, while Acting Lieutenant John Guy 
found himself dismissed from the service in 1792 for cruel, unofficerlike conduct 
towards Samuel Brown, seaman. . . .45 
 While these examples were representative of a substantial number of violent 
demonstrations of a young gentlemans authority they also suggested that, in some cases 
at least, its abuse would not be tolerated. From the commencement of the French 
Revolutionary Wars, and particularly after 1797, the court martial records revealed 
significantly fewer incidences of quarterdeck boys inflicting cruelty and violence upon a 
ships people and far more cases of their insolence, disobedience, and brutality towards 
superior officers. Of the fifty recorded courts martial of midshipmen and acting 
lieutenants from July 1797 through 1815, nearly 40 percent deal with varying levels of 
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verbal or physical abuse towards superior officers,46 by far the largest single category of 
charges recorded. 
 The shift appeared to coincide not only with the aftermath of mutiny but also 
paralleled the steady increase in the appearance of Honorables and the sons of high-
ranking gentlemen aboard His Majestys ships. This correlation hinted at the disdain 
noble and gentlemanly petty officers appear to have held for their less exalted superiors, 
suggesting that St. Vincents lament for the decay of subordination47 caused by the 
influx of young blue-bloods, indeed, had substance.   
The Breakdown of Subordination 
The popularity and prestige of a naval career for aristocratic and well-connected 
young gentlemen further obscured the quarterdeck boys status which suspended him 
somewhere between the level of a low-grade warrant officer and commissioned rank. The 
infiltration of social rank into the once-separate world of service rank further muddied the 
waters of naval authority. The court martial of Midshipman Owen B. Williams, a 
gentlemans son who led a pack of other well-born midshipmen in a night attack on the 
master of HMS Triumph as the latter slept ashore, presented a case of youthful 
conceptions of social precedence exercising authority over naval rank. As an old-school 
warrant officer with no pretension to gentility, the Triumphs master presented an 
obvious target for the drunken young gentlemen. After beating the master about the head 
with his fist or a stone, Williams opted for the ultimate degradation of rank, forcing the 
older man to walk the streets nearly naked. The master testified that he [Williams] 
called me a damned rascal, and [said] that I was not entitled to wear a sword . . . , 
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charges that confirmed Williams belief in the exclusivity of the rights of gentlemen. The 
court however, found Williams guilty, disrating him to serve before the mast as a 
common sailor.48  
Outside the jurisdiction of Admiralty law, assaults on naval authority from the 
midshipmans berth affected even the best-run ships. Collingwood wrote to J. E. Blackett 
of a fractious young gentleman who possessed both interest and family: 
The conduct and behaviour of Mr. _____ has added very much to my vexation. A 
few days since, upon the most trivial occasion, he broke out into such a fit of 
frenzy and rage, and behaved to me in so contemptuous and extraordinary a 
manner, that I desired the First Lieutenant to order him off the deck. . . . The day 
following, he wrote a letter, not excusing his conduct, but rather justifying it and 
requesting to be discharged into any other ship.49 
 
Young John Boteler, too, described the degenerate behaviour of a fellow midshipman and 
gentlemans son he named the Squire. Significant political connections had convinced 
the Squire that he was above the orders of his captain, such that when threatened with a 
flogging for one of his many offences, the young gentleman obtained a pocket pistol with 
which to defend his honor. Boteler persuaded the boy to give up his weapon, convinced 
[that] had the captain sent for him in the cabin that he [the Squire] would have shot 
him.50 Captain Gambier, losing his patience with a fourteen year-old Dillon exclaimed, 
. . . you are a refractory young gentleman. I see how it is. You rely on your influential 
connections. Quit the Cabin directly.51 These examples tend to confirm Nelsons 
observation that with respect to young Honorables, . . . they will always do as they  
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please. Orders are not for them  at least I never knew yet one who obeyed.52  
 Lieutenants in charge of noble young gentlemen found themselves in particularly 
awkward situations. Preferment to the ranks of commander and post captain depended 
almost entirely on the patronage of well-connected captains, admirals, members of the 
Board of Admiralty, or political notables. The possibility of damaging one or more of 
these avenues to promotion by the mishandling of noble and highly-ranked quarterdeck 
boys made it difficult for commissioned officers to exercise the proper authority. Aboard 
the Unité in 1807, Robert Wilson recalled that even in a ship of strict discipline, First 
Lieutenant John Wilson could not (or at least did not) enforce the mastheading of a 
midshipman, Mr. McDougal, who refused to obey his orders. Rather than confining the 
boy for insolence and insubordination, Lieutenant Wilson waited for the return of his 
captain, who later saw to the boys punishment.53  
William Dillon taunted his schoolmaster to strike away with his cane then 
warned, recollect that I am a gentleman, and beware of the consequence.54 Dillon also 
recalled an incident aboard the Saturn in 1791, which demonstrated the worst-possible 
consequences in disciplining the sons of notables. Mr. Leonard, a young gentleman of 
interest, refused his First Lieutenants orders to go to the masthead, considering himself 
above the status of such punishments. The lieutenant then ordered a gantline rigged in 
order to haul the boy aloft. Leonard was badly injured during the procedure and the 
event became known throughout the Fleet, and caused a very strong sensation among 
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the Midshipmen, many of whom were of the first families in the country. Leonard was 
advised by several to proceed legally against the Lieutenant.55 
 Leonard did not take legal action; although wider consequences soon followed. 
Bitter pamphlets circulated by Edward Moore, midshipman of HMS London and a 
gentleman of independent means, sought to rally young Honorables throughout the fleet 
at Spithead in order to avenge the injustice done Mr. Leonard. While Moore was quickly 
tried, dismissed from the service, and confined to Marshalsea prison for a time, the 
aborted Midshipmens Mutiny, confirmed the worst fears of those captains and senior 
officers who recognized the problems inherent in the gentrification of the midshipmans 
berth. The event also provided an example of the confusion, pervasive in the Royal Navy 
of the Great Wars, between social rank and naval rank.  
Richard Woodman in his introduction to Lord Cochranes autobiography also 
notes tensions operating in the other direction. . . . [I]t is equally true to say that his 
[Lord Cochranes] title automatically attracted a degree of prejudice and hostility from a 
naval service largely officered by steady, professional, middle-class men.56 Perhaps it 
was the solidarity of the titled and influential that led Admiral Philip Patton, one of the 
more democratic commentators in his field, to denounce the effects of equality amongst 
notables on the quarterdeck: 
That high degree of familiarity between the officers of different ranks under the 
pretence of the equality of gentlemen, which may be compatible with the situation 
of men composing an army, but which must undermine obedience . . . is utterly 
destructive of discipline in a situation so confined as that of a ship. . . . that 
familiarity among the different ranks of officers must prove the destruction of 
subordination.57  
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The resurgence of a patrician hegemony within the Royal Navy appeared to Patton and 
many of his contemporaries as destructive to the old paradigm of naval authority. 
Paradoxically, Royal Navy observers denounced the new trend that gave precedence to 
societys elite, while lamenting the loss of old naval traditions that rewarded merit and 
restructured shipboard society in terms of service rank. Despite Jonathan Clarks 
suggestion that eighteenth century Englishmen had no sense of living through such a 
process of modernization . . . ,58 Pattons discourses revealed at least some perception of 
change. The curious fact is that naval observers appear to have perceived the changes in 
reverse of normal theories of social dynamics recognized by scholars like Paul Langford. 
A meritocracy declining with the resurgence of aristocratic privilege confirmed change, 
but in the nature of Clarks concept of an essentially old order, absorbing conflict and 
tension within a society dominated by the elite. Those who embraced naval tradition 
embraced the old methods of officer recruitment from the rank and file and promotion 
based on performance. Royal Navy traditionalists therefore championed a socially and 
politically radical institution, subversive of the old-order hierarchies. The freedom of 
an independent meritocracy, exemplified by the navy under Lord Sandwich throughout 
the 1770s and early 80s, faded with the century as the dominant forces in English society 
 the political and social elite  asserted their control and brought the service into line 
with more traditional values. External factors, including politics and wealth, became the 
agents of change in renegotiating the social equation within both the officer corps and 
between officers and the men. The result was a resurgence of patrician hegemony that 
restored an old-order system of junior-officer selection and promotion within the service.  
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External Sources of Authority 
Religion 
 
 As one of the two pillars in Clarks theory of an ascendant elite in Georgian 
society, religion supported the old social order with the justification of divine right. The 
inseparability of religion from the laws of the land meant that Anglican values remained 
dominant in English social structures despite the growing prominence of secular issues in 
daily life and the challenges presented by Protestant Dissenters. The public structures and 
ideological rationales of Clarks confessional state signifie[d] monopoly not unanimity 
. . . [as] power was formally confined to Anglicans. . . .59 Throughout the Great Wars the 
Protestant Constitution remained firmly in place. In 1792 Samuel Heywood, a 
Unitarian Dissenter and unabashed Whig, railed at the omnipotence of the Anglican 
Church and its officers:  
Every event in life contributes to their interests; they christen; they educate; they 
marry; they church; they bury; they persuade; they frighten; they govern; and 
scarce any thing is done without them. Notwithstanding all this, they roar aloud 
that they cannot keep their ground.60  
 
The social structure supported by Anglicanism drew strength from a resurgence of 
evangelicalism in the last decades of the eighteenth century. As a reaction against the 
atheistic radicalism of the French Revolution and the increasingly Catholic character of 
Irish rebellion, conservative evangelicals assimilated the authoritarian tenets of Anglican 
doctrine in their support for old-order hierarchies. Touting national virtues such as 
obedience, submission, orderliness, respect for authority, patience in suffering, civility,  
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restraint and loyalty,61 the case in support of Anglican ideology, with all its political and 
social implications, gained momentum. Wesleyan Methodism, with its foundations in 
High Tory politics, exemplified such values and spread rapidly while its more 
democratically-oriented offshoots, such as Alexander Kilhams New Connexion 
founded in 1797 (also known as Tom Paine Methodism), saw little success in the face of 
a government poised for swift action against any rumblings of liberal reform. As E. P. 
Thompson suggests it was in the counter-revolutionary years after 1795 that Methodism 
made most headway amongst working people and acted most evidently as a stabilising or 
regressive social force.62  
The combined forces of religion and law, which supported a traditional social 
hierarchy dominated by the hereditary elite, became increasingly evident in the Royal 
Navy of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. The rigging of church every 
Sunday aboard Georgian men-of-war (when the requirements of the service allowed it) 
brought this message home to mariners in sermons preached either by a commissioned 
parson, a passenger cleric, or in many instances, the captain himself. At least once a 
month a reading of the Articles of War followed church service. In such a setting 
Admiralty law took on a quasi-religious quality, drilling the message of submission to 
authority by right of laws, both natural and revealed, via the trappings and rhetorical style 
of a religious sermon. In 1806 young Robert Wilson recalled, . . . on board H. M. ships, 
the Articles of War are ordained to be read the first Sunday in every month, which the 
seamen term saying prayers.63 In ships without chaplains or captains well motivated to 
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religious instruction, a reading of the Articles of War might replace divine service 
altogether. In the Royal Navy, the law and the church were effectively one. Clark sees the 
unity of church and law as a ubiquitous feature of English society in the long eighteenth 
century and one of the primary agents in the maintenance of an ancien régime.  
Beyond forming the social cement that bound legal and religious doctrine, the 
spiritual role of church service aboard men-of-war remained limited. The first Article of 
War demanded:  
All commanders, captains, and officers, in or belonging to any of His Majesty's 
ships or vessels of war, shall cause the public worship of Almighty God, 
according to the liturgy of the Church of England established by law, to be 
solemnly, orderly and reverently performed in their respective ships; and shall 
take care that prayers and preaching, by the chaplains in holy orders of the 
respective ships, be performed diligently; and that the Lord's day be observed 
according to law.64 
 
The frequency of religious services, however, remained at the discretion of individual 
captains and at the mercy of wind, weather, and the demands of the service. The 
Reverend Edward Mangin bore no illusions as to the priority granted to ministering 
aboard a ship: 
Of my comrades, most of them were either too much engaged with the business of 
the ship, or too confined and technical in the turn of their minds. . . . to go among 
the crew, and discourse with them of religion and morality, I have already shown 
not to be very practicable. . . . I accordingly felt myself most awkwardly situated 
and fancied I was somewhat like a pet bear on board. I was fed, coaxed and stared 
at: if in my den, forgotten; if at large, in everybodys way; of no manner of use  
and at best endured!65 
 
Mangin was far from delighted with shipboard life, although it appeared that his 
melancholy did not stem from any ill-treatment directed at him by the ships company. 
Upon leaving the vessel Mangin wrote of his shipmates, I can not omit observing that 
                                                
64 www.io.com/gibbonsb/articles.html, The Articles of War, 1749, accessed 1/12/06. 
65 Rev. Edward Mangin, Edward Mangins Journal, in Thursfield, Naval Journals, p. 22. 
  81
they united in treating me and my office with respect: and in behaviour at Divine 
Worship, would have set a worthy example to the most decorous congregation on  
shore. . . . The point however, remained: . . . [to] convert a man-of-wars crew into 
Christians would be a task to which the courage of Loyola, the philanthropy of Howard 
and the eloquence of St. Paul united, would prove inadequate.66  
Despite such commentary and Brian Laverys conclusion that religion played 
very little part in the life of the seaman,67 the subtext of religious order underscored, at 
least for those of the lower deck, the need for rigorous observance of subordination. To a 
large extent, religious instruction aboard ship was more a matter of didactic style over 
religious substance. Whether church rigged on Sundays involved a sermon on creation 
or a litany on the Articles of War the message, effectively, remained the same. Holy law 
prescribed an unquestioned faith in the judgment of shipboard superiors  even if those 
superiors were boys, largely ignorant of seamanship and the professional requirements of 
command.  
By the start of the Napoleonic Wars, birth and interest had privileged many 
aristocratic and gentlemanly boys to the quarterdeck. Leadership afloat, like leadership 
ashore, received a vital boost from a religious dogma that preached obedience and respect 
for authority both natural and ascribed, regardless of its age or professional credentials.  
Politics  
 Midshipmen and quarterdeck boys, as embryonic gentlemen officers, drew 
authority from the political forms of English society which supported governance based 
on the hereditary right of societys natural leaders. Even John Lockes Two Treatises of 
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Government did not deny the hierarchical nature of society, the patriarchal role of 
government, or the influence of old-order entitlements to authority. That all Men by 
Nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of Equality . . . Birth may 
subject some, and Alliance or Benefits others, to pay an Observance to those whom 
Nature, Gratitude or other Respects may have made it due. . . .68 Such old-order 
sentiments prevailed in 1793 as Tory Prime Minister, William Pitt the Younger, after 
nearly ten years at Downing Street, shed the remnants of his liberal-reformist cloak and 
assumed the mantle of an arch conservative. The hammer of English Jacobinism, Pitt 
suspended habeas corpus in 1794, and in 1796 instituted a series of gagging bills 
which represented a significant ratcheting-up of his repressive responses to 
discontent.69 As a war-time prime minister, Pitt was acutely aware of the importance of 
the armed services, despite his self-professed shortcomings as a military man. 
Disappointments with Englands Continental army did not, however, dampen his 
enthusiasm for the navy as the dominant force in Britains war machine.  
The strength of Pitts belief in the Royal Navy and concern for her welfare 
resulted in the removal of his elder brother, the 2nd Earl of Chatham, from the position of 
First Lord of the Admiralty in 1794. Pitt understood only too well that Chatham lacked 
the drive and intellectual grasp to run the navy at the height of a global war.70  
The appointment of the moderate Portland Whig, Earl Spencer, as First Lord 
represented a more sound investment in the operational effectiveness of the Royal Navy 
and a new focus on the naval strategy. Spencer, however, seized the opportunity to 
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indulge prejudices that favored the political elite in the appointment of young gentlemen 
and officers, exploiting his powers of patronage for both parliamentary and personal gain. 
Accordingly, privileged boys benefited from Spencers methods. As a protégé and close 
relation of the Lady Spencer, young Edward Fellowes rose from midshipman to captain 
in twenty months,71 a feat of unprecedented advancement, even amongst the navys 
most brilliant young officers. In response to the importunities and remonstrances of 
Lord Carnarvon, who made such an outcry about his sons disappointments, Spencer 
saw to it that Midshipman Lord Charles Herbert made lieutenant at eighteen and post 
captain at twenty.72 Yet, the First Lord was not oblivious to the needs of the service as a 
whole. Sensible of the legitimacy of grievances aired by the Spithead mutineers, Spencer 
was instrumental in convincing Pitt to yield to their demands.73 The Nore uprising, 
however, with its subversive political agenda, elicited a far less conciliatory response 
from either the First Lord or the Prime Minister. As William Hague notes, Pitt, the 
champion of enlightened reform had now become the chief agent of repression.74  
 Ironically, the repression of political dissent within the Royal Navy was applied 
with greater gusto by the Addington administrations choice of First Lord. Despite his 
Foxite Whig allegiances, the Earl St. Vincent escalated attacks on corruption in the 
dockyards, venality among Navy Board members, and Jacobinism within the service to 
the level of witch-hunts. The public face of St. Vincents policies also appeared to turn 
the tables on traditional aristocratic influence by insisting that places for all existing 
officers must be found before other promotions would take place. Such democratic 
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principles also extended to the appointment and promotion of young gentlemen. The 
Times commented on St. Vincents plan, noting that the system is undoubtedly just and 
highly honourable to him, but if the noble Lord can pursue such a rigorous and impartial 
line of conduct for a continuance, it will be more than his predecessors have been able to 
accomplish.75 In practice, such noble ideals were beyond St. Vincent too. His actions 
over the following years demonstrated much partisan handling of appointments across the 
spectrum of naval command, from midshipmen to post captains. St. Vincent bragged on 
the impartiality he demonstrated towards his own nephew who, despite uncommon 
merit, he refused to promote [even] at the request of four princes of the blood. The 
First Lord did, in fact, promote the boy, ensuring him a post captaincy at age nineteen.76  
Lord Thomas Cochrane, on the other hand, was a dyed-in-the-wool Tory and high 
on St. Vincents black list. Even Cochranes celebrated action against a Spanish xebec 
frigate, far superior in guns and men to his own four-pounder brig, could not gain his step 
to post captain. Cochrane quoted an early biographer of St. Vincent in his own memoirs: 
Lord St Vincent was so much pressed on the subject of Lord Cochranes promotion for 
taking the Gamo, that it became almost a point of etiquette with the earl not to make him 
a captain. Cochrane was certainly not short on powerful interest, though in this case, it 
did little good. An illustrious person is reported to have said, My Lord, we must make 
Lord Cochrane post; to which Lord St Vincent replied, The First Lord of the 
Admiralty knows no must.77 Even when St. Vincents moral barometer operated well, 
such political biases exemplified the fact that Admiralty favor functioned almost 
exclusively within the highest ranks of society. Patronage, interest, and political favor 
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determined opportunities for a naval career, leaving the sons of the unconnected to rely 
on little more than luck in their struggle for recognition and promotion.   
Prime Minister Addingtons search for political legitimacy, via the appointment 
of a celebrated naval hero like St. Vincent as First Lord, backfired disastrously, leaving 
the Royal Navy decimated by 1803. St. Vincent had wrecked morale and efficiency, 
reduced the [dock]yards workforce by a fifth and badly damaged their capacity to 
recruit. The results were visible in the miserable state of the fleet by the 
recommencement of war in 1803. In 1797, 108 ships of the line and 293 frigates and 
smaller vessels were in active service, 82 percent of the total fleet. By 1805 the 
proportion of operational vessels had fallen to 40 percent with only 83 ships of the line in 
commission and an acute shortage of frigates and men to man them.78 The downsizing 
translated into even narrower opportunities for quarterdeck boys and an even greater 
concentration of Honorable young gentlemen within the fleet.79  
The return of Pitt as Prime Minister in 1804, coupled with the appointment of 
Henry Dundas, now Lord Melville, as First Lord ushered in a new era of rapid 
mobilization and naval expansion. Melvilles impeachment for corruption less than a year 
later did little to halt the growth of the Royal Navy. The efforts of his successor, Charles 
Middleton, Lord Barham, along with years of successful battles and prize captures, 
helped to build the navys largest fleet ever by 1810, with a total of 152 ships of the line 
and 183 cruisers.80 The expanded fleet did not, however, open opportunities for the 
multitudes of deserving young gentlemen. Decades of largely unregulated entry had 
produced a glut of quarterdeck boys while the continued popularity of a naval career for 
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the sons of the social and political elite only heightened competition for limited positions. 
The old system of interest and patronage continued and, indeed, intensified. After Pitts 
death, a series of short-lived governments, all Tory except for Grenvilles facetiously 
named Ministry of the Talents, sought to maintain the old social structures of the nation 
and the navy alike, pursing policies that generally conformed to Pitts maxim of 
improvement instead of innovation  redesign rather than revolution.81  
Lord Collingwood, a representative of the old guard, believed in the effectiveness 
of old-order paternalism as a means of maintaining naval discipline. As naval equivalents 
of the ruling class, he believed that officers were responsible for shielding mariners from 
disruptive influences, particularly those stirred by political radicals. The mutinies of 
1797, which hinted at the political potential of more than one hundred thousand82 lower-
deck men, emphasized the need for more ardent paternalistic control. Many saw the 
devastating potential of a rebellious political solidarity among the sailors of England. 
Commentators, both Tory and Whig, sought to explain the 1797 uprisings as the work of 
Dissenting religious sects; corresponding societies; and/or political subversives such as 
Foxite Whigs, Jacobins, and Irish rebels. Despite the lack of evidence connecting any of 
these groups to the mutinies,83 the government, naval authorities, newspapers, and 
conservative magazines laid blame on the nearest manifestations of political, social, or 
religious heterodoxy. The ugly truth, which many refused to accept, was that honest tars, 
the simple salts of the Royal Navy, had conceived of mutiny on their own without 
ingesting any of the radical poisons of the day.  
                                                
81 Hague, Pitt, p. 494. 
82 The Royal Navy reached its maximum size in terms of men, just over 140,000 between 1808 and 1810,  
    Rodger, Command, p. 499. 
83 Ibid., p. 448. 
  87
While this in itself suggested some form of communal change in the character of 
British sailors, Clarks model couches an explanation for this change in terms of the 
breakdown of paternalistic duty. Admiralty neglect for the welfare of its seamen 
constituted a forfeiture of the utilitarian contract between those who commanded and 
those who obeyed. The Royal Navy of the 1790s had, as a paternal institution, failed to 
fulfill its basic promise to be useful to those under its authority  to feed, clothe, pay, and 
administer health care to its mariners. Yet, the protests that erupted into the Spithead and 
Yarmouth mutinies quietly dissolved as sailors demands were met. From the lower-deck 
point of view, Admiralty concessions restored the utility of the relationship and 
resurrected a functional paternalistic system. The imbalance within the naval relationship 
was corrected, but within the framework of the old order.  
According to Lieutenant William Hotham, the conduct of the mutineers exhibited 
a marked civility and deference. Of the delegates he insisted, [they] are not to be 
understood as ringleaders of a mutinous assembly, but as men appointed by the majority 
of each ships company, in order to prevent confusion and obtain as speedy a regularity 
of affairs as possible.84 In this way, Hotham spoke to the apologetic quality of the 
Yarmouth mutiny despite the legitimacy of its grievances. The Great Mutinies did little to 
further causes such as the rights of man, the ascendancy of the individual, or freedom 
of thought or action within the service. The Royal Navy remained an hierarchical 
oligarchy based on unquestioned obedience to superiors, backed up by repressive 
political policies that meted out capital punishment as a solution to the slightest forms of 
ideological dissent. In short, it mirrored precisely the characteristics of Pitts political 
state.  
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While improvements occurred in the conditions under which the men lived and 
worked, and approaches to discipline softened in the years after the mutinies, the basic 
structure of shipboard society remained intact, sustained equally from below as from 
above. In Clarks model, these changes and fluctuations occurred within the framework 
of the dynastic idiom.85 Challenges to the older order appeared frequently in late-
eighteenth century England, yet social and governmental leadership remained in the 
hands of the elite by way of a combination of factors including: 
appreciation for the advantages derived from [aristocratic government] . . . 
coercion . . . habits and customs . . . [which] men appeared to obey not for the true 
reason that they helped maintain social order, but for reasons which often seemed 
entirely fanciful, or for no reason at all.86 
 
Such characteristics are equally applicable to the structure of authority in the 
Royal Navy. The power granted to young gentlemen originated from the same sources 
that determined political and social hierarchies, both of which equally reflected the 
continued dominance of the patrician classes. The Royal Navy of the Napoleonic Wars, 
like the society it protected, remained a patriarchal, confessional state dominated by 
providential status . . . [and] structured vertically rather than horizontally . . . [It was] a 
society fixated on the social theory of its elite. . . .87 
Education 
 Education, or the lack of it, presented one of the most immovable barriers 
between quarterdeck and lower deck throughout the long eighteenth century. Despite the 
institution of philanthropic schools for the poor throughout major urban centers by the 
1780s, the practical availability of schooling for the masses lay many decades in the 
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future. Public schools like Westminster, Eton, Harrow, and Rugby catered to the wealthy 
upper-classes and generally provided boys with classical humanist educations designed to 
prepare them for life as a gentleman. Even for those able to afford public schools, 
practical naval skills such as mathematics and navigation often required specialist 
instruction. The poor reputation of the Royal Naval Academy/College during the Great 
Wars suggested similar shortcomings in the practical instruction of future officers. The 
making of a man of science, as Peter Cullen suggested all potential commanders must 
be, separated even very young officers from the men of the lower deck:  
Mathematics, Astronomy, Navigation, Gunnery, etc. are sciences which the 
officer must know or he cannot be an officer, the common seaman needs not  
and learns not. This is the grand basis of Naval Discipline, and navies cannot exist 
without it. To the landsman this appears slavery, but it is not; it is ignorance 
submitting to knowledge, and is true wisdom and discretion.  
 
According to Cullen, education provided the first foundations of old-order paternalism:  
. . . a seaman looks up to his officer, as a son to his father, whom he knows to be more 
wise, more experienced, and more skilful than he can possibly be, because he is 
scientifically taught.88 When applied to the relationship between a twenty-year lower-
deck veteran and a fourteen year-old midshipmen, Cullens opinion appeared distinctly 
colored by his faith in the old social system. Written in 1800, Cullens journal mirrored 
widely-held beliefs on the educational state of naval command and the importance of 
maintaining a safe level of ignorance among its seamen.  
For the average tar, the possibility of attaining even a rudimentary education 
remained slim. Although literacy in England rose substantially in the second half of the 
eighteenth century, the lot of the common sailor, separated from the land for years on 
end, set him apart from wider social developments. Often raised at sea, Georgian 
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mariners seldom gained access to the quantity or quality of education they might be 
exposed to ashore. Thursfield notes the exceptions to this rule in his introduction to 
Letters from the Lower Deck. The quality of both the prose and the hand in the samples 
published are noteworthy as illustrating the high standard of literacy of men serving on 
the lower deck at the end of the 18th century. . . .  Yet, Thursfield also warns, . . . it 
would perhaps be unwise to conclude that the standard indicated . . . was general; for 
these particular letters have no doubt survived because they were so well written.89 
Assistance from educated press men, volunteers, bounty, and quota men oftentimes 
presented the best educational opportunities for life-long mariners.  
 Such institutionalized illiteracy reflected old attitudes towards educating the poor, 
which some suggested would be prejudicial to their morals and happiness; it would 
teach them to despise their lot in life . . . [and] render them fractious and refractory.90 
The gulf sustained by such beliefs only reinforced the authority of any officer, petty or 
otherwise, who could read and add well enough calculate a ships position. Other social 
commentators supported the education of the lower orders not to close the gap but to 
keep them firmly in their place: It is through education that the poor become acquainted 
with the duties they owe to society.91 Even Paul Langford notes, . . . there was a very 
deep need, perhaps reinforced by the very instability of commercial society, to stress the 
divine requirement and political desirability of social subordination.92 Such a sentiment 
was fully realized in the naval social order and facilitated through selective education.  
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 The counter to such arguments was no less vocal and came from an equally 
distinguished camp. Captain Sir Alexander Ball argued that . . . the education of the 
lower classes was of the utmost consequence to the permanent security of the empire, 
even for the sake of our navy.93 Admiral Patton agreed that the future of the navy lay in 
the hands of its seamen, though he stopped short of prescribing a system for educating the 
men above and beyond their station.  
Others saw the argument as moot. Roy Porter notes that education, whether for 
the high orders or the low, only tended to reinforce existing social, cultural and gender 
distinctions rather than break them down and make new ones.94 For the Royal Navy, the 
educational gulf dividing quarterdeck and lower deck provided strong evidence for this 
type of reinforcement of traditional social hierarchies. The ability of young gentlemen to 
read and write, navigate, and formulate tactics reflected a widening social gap within the 
Royal Navy, one which used education to legitimize authority and promote a more 
socially homogeneous midshipmans berth.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Samuel Leech was a lad of thirteen when Captain Lord William Fitzroy accepted 
him as a lower-deck boy aboard HMS Macedonian. It was a painful experience that 
Leech recorded two decades years later in a narrative colored by the evangelical reformist 
language of the late 1830s. Leech recalled the sadistic proclivities of his captain which 
also reflected in the bullying of the petty officers: 
I felt the insults and tyranny of the midshipmen. These little minions of power 
ordered and drove me round like a dog, nor did I or the other boys dare interpose  
a word. They were officers; their word was our law, and woe betide the rebellious  
boy that dared refuse implicit obedience.95 
 
Even in 1810, at a time when social reform in terms of more humane treatment for 
seamen was well established, it appeared that some old habits of command died hard. 
This was particularly evident when the subject of a young gentlemans cruelty was a 
mere boy of lowly rank with no connections to protect him. The hostility exhibited by 
young gentlemen towards boys of the lower deck might have reflected some frustration 
over limitations placed on a young gentlemans authority. It may also have reflected 
growing frustration with the state of advancement and promotion in the Royal Navy of 
the late-Napoleonic Wars.  
 A glut of officers in the service after 1793 raised the problem of unemployment 
and professional immobility. As early as 1797, the Earl Spencer recognized a crisis in 
the naval career structure as the number of officers grew faster than the number of ships 
able to accommodate them.96 The restrictions limiting the number of young gentlemen 
introduced into the service by individual captains had only ever been loosely enforced. 
                                                
95 Leech, Thirty Years, p. 21. 
96 Rodger, Command, 518.  
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The Navy Boards control of the examination for lieutenant, which operated 
independently of the Admiralty, placed no limitations on the number of quarterdeck boys 
it passed. The combined result was a bottleneck of promotion in the early years of the 
new century. As no system of decoration existed to reward the conduct of exceptional 
junior officers, promotion remained the only means of acknowledging merit. In 1804 the 
Admiralty introduced the term sub-lieutenant as a sop to the multitudes of passed 
midshipmen who could not obtain a lieutenants commission due to the lack of openings 
aboard His Majestys ships. These young men often served ignominious duty aboard 
lesser commands with gunboats and inshore patrols. As Rodger notes, . . . unfortunately 
[sub-lieutenant] was not a rank and conferred no useful status; rather the reverse, since 
gunbrig lieutenants had a bad reputation.97 
Animosity towards young Honorables and boys with significant political and 
social interest escalated as competition for promotion and placement grew fierce. Lord St. 
Vincents protest to George III that at present the Navy is so overrun by the younger 
branches of the nobility, and the sons of Members of Parliament, and they swallow up all 
the patronage . . . ,98 indicated awareness of the problem at the highest levels of English 
society.  
In the case of Lord Fitzroys appointment to Macedonian in the summer of 1810, 
the point was illustrated only too well. Just a few months earlier, Captain John Clavell, an 
officer with a distinguished career and a protégé of Collingwoods since Trafalgar, had 
begged his Admiral for assistance in finding a ship. To Clavells pleas for relief from 
half-pay, Collingwood responded: 
                                                
97 Ibid., p. 521. 
98 Tucker, St. Vincent, Vol. II, p. 267. 
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I am very sorry that you have so little prospect of getting employed at sea; 
because I am sure that there is no officer who takes the service more to heart, or 
would do it more justice than you would. I have so little influence at the 
Admiralty, that I have no reason to suppose anything which I could say would 
avail you. Lord Mulgrave [First Lord in 1809] knows my opinion of you, and the 
confidence I have in you; but the truth is, that he is so pressed by persons having 
parliamentary influence, that he cannot find himself at liberty to select those 
whose nautical skill and gallantry would otherwise present them as proper men  
for the service. A hole or two in the skin will not weigh against a vote in 
Parliament, and my influence is very light at present.99 
 
So much for the prospects of the unconnected  and for the future of the Royal Navy. 
Brilliance, daring, and valor had delivered Britain her sovereignty of the seas, yet the 
system of advancement based on merit faced serious threats from the forces of social and 
political rank. The advantage wielded by the American Navy during the War of 1812, 
stemmed from undeniable technical innovations and the vastly superior firepower of her 
super frigates. Yet the Royal Navys defeat in the conflict was absolute and must, at 
least in some part, be seen as a function of her failings at the command level.  
 It is significant however, that the service was able to rebound from its defeat in 
America to regain its status as the most powerful and successful navy in the world for the 
next century. The diplomatic weeding of unsuitable officers via promotion to land-based 
positions, whereby disgrace could be softened with a step up in both rank and pay, 
provided the most elegant solution for both the Admiralty and its well-born wash outs. 
Fitzroys situation exemplified the process which, despite his disgrace, allowed the 
wheels of promotion to carry him inexorably towards the pinnacle of the naval 
profession. Yet in matters of officer entry, opportunities grew increasingly narrow.   
                                                
99 Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood to Captain J. Clavell, October 20, 1809, in G. L. Newnham  
     Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord  
     Collingwood: Interspersed with Memoirs of his Life, First American Edition (New York: G. and C. and  
     H. Carvill, 1829), p. 405. 
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Admiralty control over the appointment of young gentlemen as future officers 
escalated in the post-war years, peaking in 1830, when the Lords Commissioners 
assumed temporary but complete control over the nomination of officer volunteers. 
Michael Lewis data reveals that of the 154 officers who entered the Navy after the war 
and had reached post-captain by 1849, only twenty-three were not the sons or grandsons 
of naval officers, peers, members of Parliament, baronets, landed gentlemen, army 
officers, bishops, deans or royalty.100 By 1858-59, 57 percent of the volunteers 
nominated as potential officers did so with the backing of peers, members of Parliament, 
baronets or knights of [Prime Minister Derbys] party. . . . Political interest backed by 
wealth became the essential prerequisite for a naval career such that even the most 
distinguished naval families sometimes had great difficulty in obtaining nominations 
without political influence.101 The trend that surfaced during the French Revolutionary 
Wars, one that led away from the naval meritocracy of mid-century towards a service 
dominated by social rank, economic status, education, and political connections, became 
institutionalized in the years after 1815. The qualities of an ancien régime that inspired 
Jeremy Bentham to denounce . . . cold, selfish, priest-ridden, lawyer-ridden, lord-ridden, 
squire-ridden, soldier-ridden England,102 were also reflected in the increasingly 
centralized old-order organization of Royal Naval command.  
 As the separation between quarterdeck boys and the men of the lower deck 
widened so too the equations of authority changed. The essential element of Jonathan 
Clarks thesis that renders it so applicable to the Royal Navy of the Great Wars is its 
acceptance of change and fluctuation within a traditional social framework. The mutinies 
                                                
100 Michael Lewis, quoted in Rodger, Officers, pp. 143-44. 
101 Rodger, Officers, p. 146. 
102 Jeremy Bentham, quoted in Clark, Society, p. 162.  
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of 1797 changed the way officers looked at the men who served under them and 
eventually forced a reconsideration of disciplinary measures. This in turn, altered the 
terms of the relationship between quarterdeck and lower deck, forcing the two even 
further apart by means of social polarization.  
The concept of patrician hegemony accurately characterizes the Royal Navy of 
the Great Wars and beyond. Its presence is visible at the level of command most 
revealing of change  that of officer entry. In terms of both the selection of quarterdeck 
boys and the evolutions that took place in the nature of the authority granted them, we 
find the embodiment of a social ancien régime. The navy encapsulated Clarks vision of 
English society at large throughout the period of the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars. The state form . . . associated with commercial and financial strength, 
fiscal efficiency, and naval success, was not the modern state in our sense: it was the 
state form identified by William Cobbett in the 1820s as Old Corruption.103  
In the Royal Navy of the nineteenth century the quarterdeck boy reflected 
changing conceptions of quarterdeck privilege. The new face of command was well-born, 
well-educated, and well-connected, and might, with any luck, also exhibit a spark of 
talent. The Royal Navy of the Great Wars institutionalized the maxim of command that 
came to dominate popular conceptions of the age  a paradigm that demanded its boys be 
both officers and gentleman.   
                                                
103 Clark, Society, p. 42. 
  97
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Primary Sources (Unpublished) 
 
National Maritime Museum, UK: 
COD/3/8. HMS Blake, Black List and Punishment Book. 
   COD/3/10. HMS Blake, Description Book. 
 JOD/148. Diary of a Midshipman Pysent. Gibraltar, 1809-11. 
PAR/102. Parker, Midshipmans daily training schedule. 
  COD/21/7. Captains Order Book, Pegasus, 1793. 
  JOD/45. Captains Order Book, Amazon, 1802, kept by J.D. Skynner. 
        PAR/102. Captains Order Book, Amazon, 1802. 
  RUSI/110. Captains Order Book, Superb, 1804. 
 SAN/V/13. Lord Sandwich to Lord Berkley, between February 16 and April 13,  
  1780.  
 
The National Archive, UK: 
 PRO ADM1/803. P. Durell, February 23, 1762. Reference to acceptable levels of  
starting. 
 PRO ADM1/2245. L. OBryen. August 8, 1756.  
 PRO ADM1/5215. Order in Council, October 10, 1805. Additions to Regulations  
and Instructions. 
PRO ADM1/5274. Court Martial of Lt. E. Elwal et al. June 5, 1741. Officer  
brutality. 
 PRO ADM1/5295. Court Martial of R. Bainbridge. December 31, 1755.  
Midshipman dismissed for drunkenness.  
PRO ADM1/5298. Court Martial of J. Halman and W. Teage. October 8, 1759.  
Acceptable levels of starting. 
 PRO ADM1/5299. f.424. Courts Martial of officers using physical violence  
against the men.  
 PRO ADM1/5299. f.160. Court Martial of William Russell, Able Seaman of  
Seaford. Not punished for knocking down a midshipman after being  
struck. 
 PRO ADM1/5299. f.335. Court Martial of Seaman refusing 12 lashes for  
knocking down a midshipman, then receiving sentence of 200 lashes. 
 PRO ADM1/5300. Court Martial of Lt. J. Burr, June 16, 1761 and Court Martial  
of  W. Roach, November 3, 1761. Reference to acceptable use of rattans.  
 PRO ADM1/5376-5401. Minutes of Courts Martial from Napoleonic Wars. 
PRO ADM7/971. Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty's Service  
at Sea, Established by His Majesty in Council, 1808. London: W.  
Winchester and Son, 1808.      
 PRO ADM7/999. Naval Regulations and Instructions for Sea Service. 1757. 
 PRO ADM12/27B. Black Book. Vol. I, 1741-1793. 
 PRO ADM12/27C. Black Book. Vol. II, 1794-1807. 
 PRO ADM12/27D. Black Book. Vol. III, 1807-1815. 
  98
 Muster Rolls for the fleet at the Battle of Quiberon Bay, November 20, 1759: 
 PRO ADM36/5033. HMS Burford 
 PRO ADM36/5245. HMS Chichester 
 PRO ADM36/5282. HMS Coventry 
 PRO ADM36/5302. HMS Chatham 
 PRO ADM36/5347. HMS Defiance 
 PRO ADM36/5362. HMS Duke 
 PRO ADM36/5391. HMS Dunkirk 
 PRO ADM36/5446. HMS Dorsetshire 
 PRO ADM36/5469. HMS Essex 
 PRO ADM36/5577. HMS Falkland 
 PRO ADM36/5747. HMS Royal George 
 PRO ADM36/5829. HMS Hercules 
 PRO ADM36/5836. HMS Hero 
 PRO ADM36/5847. HMS Intrepid 
 PRO ADM36/5933. HMS Kingston 
 PRO ADM36/6109. HMS Magnanime 
 PRO ADM36/6119. HMS Montague 
 PRO ADM36/6125. HMS Minerva 
 PRO ADM36/6141. HMS Mars 
 PRO ADM36/6255. HMS Namur 
 PRO ADM36/6342. HMS Portland 
 PRO ADM36/6448. HMS Rochester 
 PRO ADM36/6482. HMS Revenge 
 PRO ADM36/6490. HMS Resolution 
 PRO ADM36/6702. HMS Swiftsure 
 PRO ADM36/6752. HMS Sapphire 
 PRO ADM36/6838. HMS Torbay 
 PRO ADM36/6883. HMS Temple 
 PRO ADM36/6948. HMS Union 
 PRO ADM36/6971. HMS Vengeance 
 PRO ADM36/7068. HMS Warspite 
 
 Selected Muster Rolls for March to December, 1814: 
 PRO ADM37/4123. HMS Rippon 
 PRO ADM37/4146. HMS Swiftsure 
 PRO ADM37/4171. HMS Union 
PRO ADM37/4175. HMS Vengeur 
PRO ADM37/4185. HMS Ville de Paris 
 PRO ADM37/4188. HMS Warspite 
PRO ADM37/4194. HMS York 
PRO ADM37/4198. HMS Aeolus 
PRO ADM37/4217. HMS Amphion 
 PRO ADM37/4226. HMS Belle Roule 
 PRO ADM37/4232. HMS Bacchante 
 PRO ADM37/4270. HMS Euralys 
  99
 PRO ADM37/4275. HMS Experiment 
 PRO ADM37/4313. HMS Hyperion 
 PRO ADM37/4320. HMS Imperieuse 
 PRO ADM37/4326. HMS Indefatigable 
PRO ADM37/4328. HMS Jason 
 PRO ADM37/4338. HMS Leopard 
 PRO ADM37/4392. HMS Quebec 
 PRO ADM37/4400. HMS Rainbow 
 PRO ADM37/4415. HMS Surprize 
 PRO ADM37/4421. HMS Solebay 
PRO ADM37/4429. HMS Thames 
PRO ADM37/4447. HMS Unite 
  
 PRO ADM107/5. Lieutenants Passing Certificates. 1759. 
 PRO ADM107/32-33. Lieutenants Passing Certificates. 1805. 
 PRO ADM107/46-47. Lieutenants Passing Certificates. 1814. 
PRO Reference Books 359.3 ADB. Steels Navy List. December, 1795, 1797,  
1799, 1801, 1803, 1804, 1806, 1807, November 1810, August 1812,  
November 1814. 
  
Primary Sources (Published) 
 
Bellamy, R. Reynall. Editor and Introduction. Rambin Jack: The Journal of Captain  
John Cremer, 1700-1774. London: Jonathan Cape, 1936. 
 
Boteler, Captain John Harvey. Recollections of My Life at Sea, from 1808 to 1830. Edited  
by David Bonner-Smith. Navy Records Society, Vol. LXXXII. London:  
Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co., 1942. 
 
Cochrane, Admiral Lord. The Autobiography of a Seaman. Introduction by Richard  
Woodman. New York: Lyons Press, 2000. 
 
Collingwood, G. L. Newnham. A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence  
of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood: Interspersed with Memoirs of his Life.  
London: James Ridgway,1828. 
 
________. A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral  
Lord Collingwood: Interspersed with Memoirs of his Life. First American Edition.  
New York: G. and C. and H. Carvill, 1829.  
 
Dillon, Sir William Henry. A Narrative of my Personal Adventures, 1790-1839. Vols. I  
and II. Edited by Michael A. Lewis. Navy Records Society, Vols. XCIII and  
XCVII. London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co., 1953 and 1956. 
 
 
 
  100
Erskine, David, Editor. Augustus Herveys Journal: Being the Intimate Account of the  
Life of a Captain in the Royal Navy Ashore and Afloat 1746-1759. London:  
William Kimber, 1953.  
 
Gardner, James Anthony. Above and Under Hatches: Being Naval Recollections in  
Shreds and Patches with Strange Reflections. Edited by Christopher Lloyd.  
London: Batchworth Press, 1955.  
 
__________. Recollections of James Anthony Gardner, Commander R.N., 1775-1814.  
Edited by R. Vesey Hamilton and John Knox Laughton. Navy Records Society,  
Vol. XXXI. London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co., 1906. 
 
Hall, Basil. Fragments of Voyages and Travels: Including Anecdotes of Naval Life.  
Edinburgh: Cadell, 1831. 
    
Hay, Robert. Landsman Hay, the Memoirs of Robert Hay, 1789-1847. Edited by M. D.  
Hay. London: R. Hart-Davis, 1953.  
 
Hughes, Edward. Editor. The Private Correspondence of Admiral Lord Collingwood.  
Navy Records Society, Vol. XCVIII. London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and  
Co., 1957. 
 
Jackson, George Vernon. The Perilous Adventures and Vicissitudes of a Naval  
Officer, 1801-1812: Being the Memoirs of Admiral George Vernon Jackson 
  1787-1876. Edited by Harold Burrows. London: William Blackwood and Sons  
Ltd, 1927. 
   
Leech, Samuel. Thirty Years from Home; or, a Voice from the Main Deck. London: H. G.  
Collins, 1851.  
 
Lloyd, Christopher and R. C. Anderson. Editors. A Memoir of James Trevenen. Navy  
Records Society, Vol. CI. London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co., 1959. 
 
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. Edited by Peter Laslett. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
 
Long, W. H. Editor. Naval Yarns, Letters and Anecdotes, Comprising Accounts of Sea- 
fights and Wrecks, Actions with Pirates and Privateers etc. from 1616-1831.  
Wakefield, UK: E. P. Publishing, 1973.  
 
Mackenzie, Colonel Robert Holden. The Trafalgar Roll; The Ships and The Officers.  
Introduction by Colin White. London: Chatham Publishing, 2004.  
 
Nicholas, N. H. Editor. The Dispatches and Letters of Lord Nelson. The Nicholas  
Edition. Vols. I and II, 1795-1797. London: Chatham Publishing, 1997. 
    
  101
Robinson, William [Jack Nastyface, pseud.]. Nautical Economy, or Jack Nastyface,  
Memoirs of a Seaman. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983.  
 
Spavens, William. The Narrative of William Spavens, a Chatham Pensioner: Written by 
Himself: a Unique Lower Deck View of the Navy of the Seven Years War.  Edited  
by N.A.M. Rodger. London: Chatham Publishing, 1998. 
  
Thompson, Edward. Sailor's Letters: Written to his Select Friends in England During his  
Voyages and Travels in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America from the Year 1754 to  
1759. Second Edition. Vol. I. London: Becket and de Hondt, 1767. 
 
Thursfield, H. G. Editor. Five Naval Journals, 1789-1817. Navy Records Society, Vol. 
XCI. London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co., 1951.  
 
Tucker, Jedediah S. Editor. Memoirs of the Right Honourable the Earl St. Vincent  
G. C. B. etc. Vols. I and II. London: Richard Bentley, 1884.   
 
Warner, Oliver. The Life and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood. London: Oxford  
University Press, 1968.  
 
White, Colin. Editor. Nelson: The New Letters. Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: Boydell Press,  
2005.  
  
Secondary Sources  
 
Adams, Max. Trafalgars Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of  
Napoleon. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2005. 
 
Austen, Jane. Persuasion. Introduction and notes by Susan Ostrov Weisser. New York:  
Barnes and Noble Classics, 1993. 
 
Bromley. J. S. Editor. Manning the Royal Navy; Selected Public Pamphlets 1639-1873.  
Navy Records Society, Vol. 119. London: William Clowes and Sons, 1976. 
 
Clark, J. C. D. English Society, 1688-1832: Religion, Ideology, and Politics During the  
Ancien Regime. Second Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.  
 
Clarke, James Stainer. The Naval Chronicle, 1799  1818. London: Bunney and Gold,  
1799-1818. Reprinted Woodbridge, CT: Research Publications, 1984.  
 
Conrad, Joseph. The Heroic Age. In The Mirror of the Sea. Marlboro, VT: Marlboro  
Press, 1988. 
 
Corbett, Julian S. Editor. Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816. New York: Burt Franklin,  
1967. 
 
  102
Davies, J. D. Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, the Officers and Men of the Restoration Navy. 
 Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.  
 
De Kay, James Tertius. Chronicles of the Frigate Macedonian, 1809-1922. New York:  
 W. W. Norton, 2000.  
 
Ehrman, John. The Navy in the War of William III 1689-1697, its State and Direction. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953. 
 
Glete, Jan. Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies, and State Building in Europe and  
America, 1500-1860. Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1993.  
 
Goodwin, Peter. The Ships of Trafalgar: The British, French and Spanish Fleets, 21  
 October, 1805. London: Conway Maritime, 2005. 
 
Hague, William. William Pitt the Younger. New York: Alfred P. Knopf, 2005. 
 
Harding, Edward. Naval Biography: or the History and Lives of Distinguished  
Characters in the British Navy from the Earliest Period of History to the Present  
Time. London: West and Hughes, 1800. 
 
Harding, Richard. Seapower and Naval Warfare, 1650-1830. Annapolis: Naval Institute  
Press, 1999.   
 
Hempton, David. Religion and Political Culture in Britain and Ireland: from the  
Glorious Revolution to the Decline of Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
Press, 1996.  
 
Herman, Arthur. To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World.  
New York: Harper Collins, 2004.  
 
Holmes, Geoffrey. Augustan England: Professions, State and Society, 1680-1730.  
London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982. 
 
Kemp, Peter. The British Sailor: A Social History of the Lower Deck. London: Dent  
Publishers, 1970. 
 
Langford, Paul. A Polite and Commercial People, England 1727-1783. New Oxford  
History of England. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.  
 
__________. Editor. The Eighteenth Century, 1688-1815. Oxford: Oxford University  
Press, 2002. 
 
Lavery, Brian. Nelsons Navy: the Ships, Men and Organization, 1793-1815. Annapolis:  
Naval Institute Press, 2000. 
 
  103
__________. Editor. Shipboard Life and Organization, 1731-1815. Navy Records  
Society, Vol. 138. Brookefield, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 1998.  
 
Lewis, Michael. Englands Sea Officers: The Story of the Naval Profession. London:  
Allen and Unwin, 1948.  
 
__________. The Navy in Transition: A Social History, 1814-1864. London: Hodder and  
Stoughton, 1965. 
 
__________. A Social History of the Navy, 1793-1815. London: Allen and Unwin,  
1960. 
 
Mahan, Alfred T. Types of Naval Officers Drawn from the History of the British Navy,  
with Some Account of the Conditions of Naval Warfare at the Beginning of the  
Eighteenth Century and of its Subsequent Development During the Sail Period.  
London: S. Low, Marston, 1901.  
 
__________. The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain.  
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001. 
 
Marcus, Geoffrey. Quiberon Bay. Barre, MA: Barre Publishing Company, 1963. 
 
Oppenheim, M. A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy and Merchant  
Shipping in Relation to the Navy: From 1509 to 1660, with an Introduction  
Treating of the Preceding Period. Hamburg, NJ: Shoe String Press, 1961.  
 
Pope, Dudley. Decision at Trafalgar. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1999.  
 
Porter, Roy. English Society in the Eighteenth Century. Revised Edition. London:  
Penguin Books, 1991. 
 
Powell, J. R. The Navy in the English Civil War. Introduction by C. V. Wedgwood.  
London: Archon Books, 1962. 
 
Rodger, N. A. M. The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815. 
 New York: W. W. Norton, 2005. 
 
__________. Officers, Gentlemen and their Education, 1793-1860. In Les Empires en  
Guerre et Paix, Journées Franco-Anglais dHistoire de la Marine, Portsmouth,  
23-36 Mars, 1988. Edited by Edward Freeman. Vincennes, France: Service 
Historique de la Marine, 1990. 
 
__________. The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy. New York: W. W.  
Norton, 1996. 
 
 
  104
Thompson, E. P. The Making of the English Working Class. London: Vintage Press,  
1966.  
 
Vincent, Edgar. Nelson: Love and Fame. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.  
 
Online Sources 
 
www.io.com/gibbonsb/articles.html. The Articles of War, 1749. 
 
www.oxforddnb.com. The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography online.  
 
www.royal-navy.mod.uk/static/pages/4741.html. For information on the Royal Naval  
College.  
  105
APPENDIX A: HONORABLE LIEUTENANTS PASSED BY YEAR, 
PER STEELS NAVY LIST 
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APPENDIX B: HONORABLE QUARTERDECK BOYS OF THE  
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, 1805 
 
 
Ship/Guns/Command No. Quarterdeck Boys No. "Honorable" Boys Total QDeck 
  by Rating  (son of baronet or higher) Boys 
Victory (104) - Nelson/Hardy Mids=22, V1=9 2 31 
Royal Sovereign (100) - Coll./Rotherham Mids=21, V1=7 0 28 
Britannia (100) - Northesk/Bullen Mids=26, V1=4 0 30 
Temeraire (98)  Harvey Mids=18, V1=8 0 26 
Neptune (98)  Fremantle Mids=16, V1=6 1 22 
Dreadnought (98)  Conn Mids=15, V1=1 0 16 
Prince (98)  Grindall Mids=25, V1=2 0 27 
Tonnant (80)  Tyler Mids=12 0 12 
Belleisle (74)  Hargood Mids=15, V1=6 0 21 
Revenge (74)  Moorsom Mids=16, V1=2 0 18 
Spartiate (74)  Laforey Mids=17 1 17 
Mars (74)  Duff Mids=17, V1=9 2 26 
Definance (74)  Durham Mids=18, V1=4 1 22 
Minotaur (74)  Mansfield Mids=13, V1=2 0 15 
Conquerer (74) - I. Pellew Mids=16, V1=9 0 25 
Achilles (74)  King Mids=14, V1=3 0 17 
Colossus (74)  Morris Mids=14, V1=2 0 16 
Defence (74)  Hope Mids=14, V1=1 1 15 
Leviathan (74)  Bayntun Mids=11, V1=5 0 16 
Bellerophon (74)  Cooke Mids=16, V1=6 1 22 
Orion (74)  Codrington Mid=13, V1=7 2 20 
Swiftsure (74)  - Rutherford Mids=16, V1=5 1 21 
Ajax (74)  Pilford Mids=17, V1=7 1 24 
Thunderer (74) Stockham Mids=9, V1=4 0 13 
Polyphemus (64)  Redmill Mids=10 0 10 
Africa (64)  Digby Mids=11, V1=6 0 17 
Agamemnon (64)  Berry Mids=12, V1=3 0 15 
Euryalus (36)  Blackwood Mids=10 1 10 
Phoebe (36)  Capel Mids=10, V1=4 1 14 
Naiad (36)  Dundas Mids=6, V1=3 0 9 
Sirius (36)  Prowse Mids=6, V1=3 1 9 
Pickle (Schooner)  Lapenotiere ?=1 0 1 
Entreprenante (Cutter)  Young ?=2 0 2 
        
Total Ships = 33   16 587 
    
Percentage of "Honorable" Boys in Trafalgar Fleet: 2.73%   
  Key: Mids = Midshipmen, V1 = Volunteers First Class 
 
 
  Source: Robert Mackenzie, The Trafalgar Roll: The Ships and Officers, intro. by Colin White (London:  
  Chatham Publishing, 2004)  
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APPENDIX C: HONORABLE QUARTERDECK BOYS OF THE 
BATTLE OF QUIBERON BAY, 1759 
 
    
Ship/Guns/Command No. Quarterdeck Boys  No. "Honorable" Boys Total QDeck 
  by Rating  (son of baronet or higher) Boys 
Royal George (100) - Hawke/Campbell Mids=20, CS=19, AS=5 0 44 
Union (90) - Hardy/Evans Mids=12, CS=30, AS=10 0 52 
Namur (90)  Buckle Mids=24, CS=32, AS=12 1 68 
Duke (90)  Graves Mids=11, CS=27 0 38 
Mars (74)  Young Mids=16, CS=23   0 39 
Warspite (74)  Bentley Mids=13, CS=24 0 37 
Hercules (74)  Fortsecue Mids=13, CS=20 0 33 
Torbay (74)  Keppel Mids=14, CS=10 1 24 
Magnanime (74)  Howe Mids=16, CS=29 2 45 
Resolution (74) - Speke (Nov 13, 1759) Mids=15, CS=26 0 41 
Hero (74)  Edgecombe Mids=11, CS=25 0 36 
Swiftsure (70)  Stanhope Mids=12, CS=24 0 36 
Dorsetshire (70)  Dennis Mids=16, CS=18 0 34 
Burford (70)  Gambier Mids=12, CS=20 0 32 
Chichester (70)  Willet Mids=15, CS=26 0 41 
Temple (70)  W. Shirley Mids=10, CS=17 0 27 
Revenge (64)  Storr Mids=14, CS=19 0 33 
Essex (64) - O'Brien Mids=11, CS=22 0 33 
Kingston (60)  T. Shirley Mids=10, CS=15 0 25 
Intrepid (60)  Maplesden Mids=10, CS=17 0 27 
Montague (60)  Rowley Mids=9, CS=16 0 25 
Dunkirk (60)  Digby Mids=6, CS=13 2 19 
Defiance (60)  Baird Mid=11, CS=15 0 26 
        
Joined between Ushant and Belle Isle:       
Rochester (50)  Duff Mids=10, CS=14 0 24 
Portland (50)  Arbuthnot Mids=9, CS=16 0 25 
Falkland (50)  Drake Mids=8, CS=15 0 23 
Chatham (50)  Lockhart Mids=9, CS=11 0 20 
Minerva (32)  A. Hood Mid=5, CS=8 0 13 
Vengence (28)  Burslem Mid=5, CS=9 0 14 
Coventry (28)  Digges Mids=4, CS=8 0 12 
Sapphire (32)  Stratchan Mids=6, CS=11 0 17 
Venus (36)  Harrison Missed     
Total Ships = 32   6 963 
    
Percentage of "Honorable" Boys in 
Quiberon Fleet: 0.62%   
 
   
  Key: Mids = Midshipmen, CS = Captains Servant, AS = Admirals Servant 
  Source: TNA: PRO ADM36/2255-7068, Muster Rolls for the fleet at the Battle of Quiberon Bay,  
  November 20, 1759. 
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Years at Sea Before Passing      
1759 1805 1814 
(of 196 Mids and Boys) (of 290 Mids and Boys) (of 291 Mids and Boys) 
      
6 yrs     102 (52.0%) 6yrs     206 (71%) 5.5yrs      102 (35.0%) 
7 yrs      39 (19.9%) 7yrs      44 (15%) 6yrs          60 (20.6%) 
8yrs       28 (14.3%) 8yrs      19 (6.5%) 7yrs          38 (13%) 
9yrs       16 (8.3%) 9yrs      10 (3.5%) 5yrs          25 (8.5%) 
10yrs      5 (2.6%) 10yrs    10 (3.5%) 8yrs          17 (5.8%) 
12yrs      2 (1.0%) 14yrs      1 (0.5%) 10yrs        15 (5.1%) 
13yrs      1 (0.5%)   9yrs          11 (3.8%) 
15yrs      1 (0.5%)   4.5yrs         8 (2.7%) 
   
Age Passed for Lieutenant Age at Entry in RN Age at Entry in RN 
1759 1805 1814 
(of 192 Mids and Boys) (of 285 Mids and Boys) (of 284 Mids and Boys) 
      
20yrs      32 (16.7%) 14yrs      62 (21.8%) 14yrs       73 (25.7%) 
25yrs      23 (12.0%) 15yrs      42 (14.7%) 15yrs       52 (18.3%) 
21yrs      22 (11.4%) 16yrs      30 (10.5%) 13yrs       49 (17.2%) 
22yrs      19 (9.9%) 13yrs      27 (9.5%) 16yrs       24 (8.4%) 
23yrs      18 (9.4%) 12yrs      24 (8.4%) 12yrs       16 (5.6%) 
24yrs      12 (6.3%) 20yrs      24 (8.4%) 18yrs       12 (4.2%) 
29yrs      12 (6.3%) 11yrs      15 (5.3%) 20yrs       12 (4.2%) 
26yrs      11 (5.7%) 18yrs      14 (4.9%) 17yrs       11 (3.9%) 
28yrs      11 (5.7%) 21yrs      14 (4.9%) 21yrs         9 (3.2%) 
   
 Entry Rank Entry Rank 
 1805 1814 
 (of 288 total) (of 290 total) 
     
Key V1       107 (37.2%) V1           148 (51%) 
V1 = Volunteer First Class AB        60 (20.8%) Boy          42 (14.5%) 
B = Boy Boy       42 (14.5%) AB           34 (11.7%) 
Mid = Midshipman Mid       26 (9.0%) Mid          20 (6.9%) 
AB = Able Seaman LM        13 (4.5%) Sup         16 (5.5%) 
Ord = Ordinary Seaman Ord       12 (4.2%) LM          14 (4.9%) 
LM = Landsman CapSvt  10 (3.5% Ord           8 (2.8%) 
CapSvt = Captain's Servant Sch       10 (3.5%)  Clerk        5 (1.7%) 
Sup = Supernumerary  Sup        4 (1.4%) Sch          2 (0.7%) 
Sch = Scholar Note: 2 to 4.5yrs credit for sea time for Sch Note: up to 2yrs credit for sea time for Sch 
 
 
Source: TNA: PRO ADM107/5 for 1759, PRO ADM107/32-33 for 1805, PRO ADM107/46-47 for 1814.
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